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Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That 
Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and 
Ahgn US and U K Financial Regulation of 
Financial Conglomerates (Part 1) 
* By Arthur E.WMmarth, Jr. 
Introduction 
In an article published in 2002, I warned that the 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy was the "great unresolved 
problem of bank supervision" because it"undermine[d] 
both supervisory and market discipline."^ I pointed out 
that Congress' enactment of the Gramm-Leach-BHIey 
Act (GLBA) aUowed financial conglomerates to span 
the entire range of our financial markets. I cautioned 
that the emerging financial giants would bring "major 
segments of the securities and life insurance industries 
. . . within the scope of the T B T F doctrine, thereby 
expanding the scope and cost of federal 'safety net' sub-
sidies." I predicted that financial conglomerates would 
take advantage of their new powers under G L B A and 
their T B T F status by pursuing risky activities in the 
capital markets and by increasing their leverage through 
"capital arbitrage."2 
In a subsequent article written seven years later, I 
noted that the financial crisis had "confirmed" all of my 
earlier predictions. As I explained: 
[R]egulators in developed nations encouraged 
the expansion of large financial conglomerates 
and failed to restrain their pursuit of short-term 
profits through increased leverage and high-risk 
activities. As a result, [those institutions] were 
allowed to promote an enormous credit boom 
[that] precipitated a worldwide financial crisis. 
Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Center for Law, 
Economics & Finance, George Washington University Law SchooL 
This article is based on testimony I presented on December 
7,20! I, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Protection of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs. Portions of this article are adapted 
from two of my previous articles, which are cited in note 4.This 
article appears in two parts, with Part 2 scheduled for the April 
issue of the Banking & Financial Services Policy Report. 
In order to avoid a complete collapse of global 
financial markets, central banks and governments 
[in the United States and Europe] have already 
provided almost $9 trillion of support . . . for 
major banks, securities firms and insurance com-
panies. Those support measures—^which are far 
firom over—estabHsh beyond any doubt that the 
T B T F policy now embraces the entire financial 
services industry.^ 
The financial crisis has demonstrated that T B T F 
subsidies create dangerous distortions in our financial 
markets and our general economy. We must ehminate 
those subsidies in order to restore a more level playing 
field for smaller financial institutions and to encourage 
the voluntary breakup of inefficient, risky financial con-
glomerates.'•The financial crisis has also proven, beyond 
any reasonable doubt, that large financial conglomerates 
operate based on a hazardous business model that is 
riddled with conflicts of interest and prone to specula-
tive risk-taking.^ 
The Dodd-FrankWall Street R e f o r m and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) estabHshes a new regu-
latory regime for systemicaUy important financial 
institutions (SIFIs). As discussed below, Dodd-Frank 
authorizes the Financial Stabihty Oversight Counc i l 
(FSOC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to 
adopt more stringent capital requirements and other 
enhanced prudential standards for SIFIs. Dodd-Frank 
also establishes the Orderly Liquidation Authority, 
which provides a superior alternative to the "bailout or 
bankruptcy" choice that federal regulators confronted 
when they dealt with failing SIFIs during the financial 
crisis. 
However, Dodd-Frank does not completely shut 
the door to future government bailouts for creditors 
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o f SIFIs. As shown below, the Fed can still provide 
emergency liquidity assistance to troubled financial 
conglomerates through the discount window and 
(potentially) through group liquidity facfiities similar to 
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which are designed 
to help the largest financial institutions. Federal Home 
L o a n Banks can still make collateralized advances to 
major banks.The F D I C can potentially use its Treasury 
borrowing authority and the "systemic risk exception" 
( S P ^ ) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to protect 
uninsured creditors o f failed SIFIs and their subsidiary 
banks. Dodd-Frank has made T B T F bailouts more 
difficult , but the continued existence of these avenues 
for financial assistance creates serious doubts about 
Dodd-Frank's ability to prevent bailouts during future 
episodes of severe financial distress. 
Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the same supervisory 
tools—capital-based regulation and prudential super-
vision—that failed to prevent the banking and thrift 
crises o f the 1980s and the current financial crisis. The 
reforms contained in Dodd-Frank also depend for their 
effectiveness on many of the same federal regulatory 
agencies that failed to stop excessive risk-taking by 
financial institutions during the credit booms that pre-
ceded both crises. 
As an alternative to Dodd-Frank's regulatory reforms, 
Congress could have tackled the T B T F problem direcdy 
by mandating a breakup o f large financial conglomer-
ates. That is the approach advocated by Simon Johnson 
and James Kwak, who have proposed maximum size 
limits o f about $600 biUion in assets for commercial 
banks and about $300 billion of assets for securi-
ties firms. Those size caps would require a significant 
reduction in size for all of the six largest U S banking 
organizations (Bank of America (BofA), JP Morgan 
Chase (Chase), Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs 
(Goldman) and Morgan Stanley).^ I am sympathetic 
to the maximum size limits proposed by Johnson and 
Kwak. However, it seems highly unlikely—especially 
i n Hght of megabanks' enormous political clout—that 
Congress could be persuaded to adopt such draconian 
hmits, absent a fiiture disaster comparable to the present 
financial crisis.^ 
A third possible approach—and the one I advo-
cate—is to impose structural requirements and activity 
Hmitations that would (i) prevent SIFIs from using the 
federal safety net to subsidize their speculative activi-
ties in the capital markets, and (ii) make it easier for 
regulators to separate banks from their nonbank affih-
ates i f a SIFI fails. As described below, my proposals for 
a pre-funded Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), a repeal 
of the S R E , and a two-tiered system of bank regula-
tion would accomplish the goals of shrinking safety 
net subsidies and minimizing the need for government 
bailouts o f SIFIs. 
A pre-fiinded O L F would require all SIFIs to pay 
risk-based assessments to finance the fiiture costs of 
resolving failed SIFIs. A repeal o f the S R E would pre-
vent the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) from being used 
as a backdoor bailout fimd for nondeposit creditors o f 
megabanks. A two-tiered system of bank regulation 
would (i) restrict traditional banking organizations to 
deposit-taking, lending, fiduciary services and other 
activities that are "closely related" to banking, and (ii) 
mandate a "narrow bank" structure for banks owned 
by financial conglomerates. The narrow bank structure 
would insulate the DIF from the risks of capital markets 
activities conducted by nonbank subsidiaries o f SIFIs, 
and would also prevent narrow banks from transferring 
their FDIC-insured, low-cost funding and other safety 
net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. 
M y approach is similar to the "ring-fencing" proposal 
recendy issued by the U K ' s Independent Commission 
on Banking, which the U K government has pledged 
to enact. Thus, the narrow banking reform provides a 
promising way for the Uni ted States and the United 
Kingdom to develop a common approach for regulat-
ing large financial conglomerates. If the host countries 
for the two most important financial centers—New 
York and London—establish consistent regimes for 
deahng with SIFIs, they would place great pressure on 
other developed nations to foUow suit. 
In combination, the "narrow bank" concept and 
my other proposed reforms would strip away many o f 
the safety net subsidies exploited by SIFIs and would 
subject SIFIs to the same type of market discipHne that 
investors have appHed in breaking up many commer-
cial and industrial conglomerates during the past three 
decades. If (as I believe) SIFIs cannot produce favor-
able returns to investors without their current T B T F 
subsidies, my approach should enable market forces to 
compel SIFIs to break up voluntarily. 
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TBTF Financial Institutions Received 
Extraordinary Governmental Assistance 
during the Financial Crisis 
The federal government provided massive amounts 
of financial assistance to large, complex financial insti-
tutions (LCFIs) during the financial crisis. The 19 
largest U S banks (each with more than $100 bUhon of 
assets) and the largest U S insurance company, American 
International Group (AIG), received $290 bil l ion 
o f capital assistance from the Troubled Asset ReUef 
Program ( T A R P ) . Federal regulators also enabled the 
same 19 banks and G E Capital (a huge finance com-
pany owned by General Electric) to issue $290 biUion 
of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt. In contrast, 
smaller banks (with assets under $100 biUion) received 
only $41 biUion of T A R P capital assistance and issued 
only $11 biUion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.^ 
The Federal Reserve System (Fed) also provided 
enormous amounts of Hquidity assistance to financial 
institutions through a series o f emergency lend-
ing programs. The total outstanding amount o f Fed 
emergency credit reached a single-day peak o f $1.2 
trilHon i n December 2008. The Fed extended the 
vast majority of this emergency credit to large U S 
and European banks and provided very Httle help 
to smaller institutions. The highest daily amount o f 
the Fed's emergency credit to the ten largest U S 
commercial and investment banks was $669 bi l l ion, 
representing more than half of the daily peak amount 
for all Fed lending programs.^ 
The Fed and the Treasury also supported finan-
cial institutions and the financial markets by 
purchasing more than $1.5 triUion of direct obligations 
and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by gov-
ernment-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In combination, 
the federal government provided more than $6 triUion 
of support to financial institutions during the finan-
cial crisis, when such support is measured by the peak 
amounts of outstanding assistance under the T A R P 
capital assistance programs. Fed emergency lending pro-
grams, F D I C debt guarantees, and other asset purchase 
and guarantee programs.^o European nations similarly 
provided more than $4 triUion o f financial support to 
their financial institutions by the end o f 2009." 
Federal regulators acted most dramatically in rescu-
ing LCFIs that were threatened with failure. Authorities 
bailed out two o f the three largest U S banks—BofA 
and Citigroup—as well as the largest U S insurance 
company, A I G . In addition, federal regulators provided 
financial support for emergency acquisitions o f two 
other major banks (Wachovia and National City), the 
two largest thrifts (Washington Mutual (WaMu) and 
Countrywide), and two of the five largest securities 
firms (Bear Stearns (Bear) and Merr iU Lynch (MerriU)). 
Regulators also approved emergency conversions of 
two other leading securities firms (Goldman and 
Morgan Stanley) into bank holding companies (BHCs) , 
thereby placing those institutions under the Fed's pro-
tective umbrella.i2 
Moreover, the federal government publicly guaran-
teed that none of the 19 largest banks would be allowed 
to fail. W h e n federal regulators announced their "stress 
tests" in early 2009, they declared that the Treasury 
Department would provide any additional capital that 
was needed to ensure the survival of all 19 banks. 
Regulators also stated that they would not impose 
regulatory sanctions on the top 19 banks under the 
"prompt corrective action" (PCA) regime established 
by Congress in 1991, despite the non-discretionary 
nature of those sanctions. Instead of issuing pubHc 
enforcement orders, regulators entered into private and 
confidential "memoranda o f understanding" with B o f i \ 
and Citigroup despite the gravely weakened conditions 
of both banks. Thus, federal regulators gave white-glove 
treatment to the 19 largest banks and unequivocally 
promised that they would survive. ^ 3 
In stark contrast, federal regulators imposed P C A 
orders and other pubHc enforcement sanctions on hun-
dreds of community banks and allowed many of those 
institutions to fail.^^ Almost 400 FDIC-insured deposi-
tory institutions failed between January 1, 2008 and 
September 30, 2011.15 Only one of those institutions— 
W a M u , a large thrift institution—had more than 
$50 biUion of assets. In view of the massive T B T F 
assistance that the federal government provided to our 
largest banks, it is smaU wonder that those banks enjoy 
a decisive advantage in funding costs over smaUer banks. 
As F D I C Chairman SheUa Bair pointed out in a speech 
on May 5, 2011, "In the fourth quarter o f [2010], the 
average interest cost o f funding earning assets for banks 
with more than $100 biUion in assets was about half the 
average for community banks with less than $1 biUion 
in assets."!^ 
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W h e n the federal government finally promised 
to help community banks, it failed to deliver. O n 
February 2, 2010, President Obama announced a new 
program that would use $30 biUion o f T A R P funds 
to assist community banks in making smaU business 
loans.18 However, in September 2011, the Treasury 
Department shut down the SmaU Business Lending 
F u n d after providing only $4.2 billion—-just 14 percent 
o f the promised amount—to community banks. 
Members of Congress strongly criticized the Treasury 
Department for long delays in approving appUcations 
by community banks and for imposing onerous condi-
tions on appHcants.15 
TBTF Subsidies Distort Financial 
Markets and Create Perverse Incentives 
fo r Excessive Risk-Taking and 
Unhealthy Consolidation 
In March 2009, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke 
acknowledged that "the too-big-to-faU issue has 
emerged as an enormous problem" because "it reduces 
market discipline and encourages excessive risk-taking" 
by T B T F firms.^o Several months later, Governor 
M e r v y n King of the Bank of England condemned 
the perverse incentives created by T B T F subsidies in 
even stronger terms. Governor K i n g maintained that 
"[t]he massive support extended to the banking sector 
around the world, while necessary to avert economic 
disaster, has created possibly the biggest moral hazard 
i n history."2i H e fiirther argued that T B T F subsidies 
provided a Hkely explanation for decisions by LCFIs to 
engage i n high-risk strategies during the credit boom: 
W h y were banks wUUng to take risks that proved 
so damaging to themselves and the rest of the 
economy? One o f the key reasons—mentioned 
by market participants in conversations before the 
crisis hit—is that incentives to manage risk and 
to increase leverage were distorted by the impHcit 
support or guarantee provided by government to 
creditors of banks that were seen as 'too important 
to fa i l . ' . . . Banks and their creditors knew that i f 
they were sufficiently important to the economy 
or the rest of the financial system, and things 
went wrong, the government would always stand 
behind them. A n d they were right.22 
Industry studies and anecdotal evidence confirm that 
T B T F subsidies create significant economic distortions 
and promote moral hazard. In recent years, and par-
ticularly during the present crisis, LCFIs have operated 
with much lower capital ratios and have benefited from 
a much lower cost of funds, compared with smaUer 
banks. In addition, credit ratings agencies and bond 
market investors have given preferential treatment to 
T B T F institutions because of the expHcit and imphcit 
government backing they receive. ^ 3 
A recent study confirms that large banks have 
received huge benefits from the impUcit T B T F sub-
sidy over the past two d e c a d e s . T h i s study, which 
analyzed publicly-traded bonds issued by U S banks 
between 1990 and 2010, concluded that bond investors 
expected the federal government to support the larg-
est banks throughout that period. Although the largest 
banks pursued riskier strategies, they issued bonds 
with significandy lower yield spreads over Treasury 
bonds, compared to bonds issued by smaUer banks.25 
AdditionaUy, the authors found that bond inves-
tors responded significantly to Fitch's "issuer" ratings 
(which included Fitch's expectation of government 
support for the biggest banks), but bond investors did 
not respond significandy to Fitch's "individual" ratings 
(which were based on the standalone strength of the 
same banks). In other words,"investors do not price the 
true, intrinsic ability of a [big] bank to repay its debts, 
but instead price implicit government support for the 
bank."26 
The authors determined that the impUci tTBTF sub-
sidy gave the largest banks: 
an annual [average] funding cost advantage of 
approximately 16 basis points before the financial 
crisis, increasing to 88 basis points during the 
crisis, peaking at more than 100 basis points in 
2008. The total value of the subsidy amounted to 
about $4 biUion per year before the crisis, increas-
ing to $60 biUion [annuaUy] during the crisis, top-
ping $84 biUion in 2008.2? 
Moreover, the authors found that "[t]he passage of 
Dodd-Frank in July of 2010 did not eUminate investors' 
expectations o f government support. In fact, expecta-
tions of government support rose in 2010 [compared to 
2009] ."28 The authors concluded that the value of the 
imphcit T B T F subsidy to the largest banks was highest 
during times of financial crisis (i.e., the 1980s, 1997-98, 
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2000-02, and 2007-10). However, the subsidy "persists 
even during times of relative tranquility" and therefore 
represents "an ongoing wealth transfer" from taxpayers 
to large banks.^5 
The financial crisis has vividly illustrated the ten-
dency of LCFIs to exploit their expHcit safety net 
subsidies (including federal deposit insurance and access 
to the Fed's Hquidity assistance) and their impHci tTBTF 
subsidy by using lower-cost funds to finance high-risk 
activities.-''' As I have explained in previous articles, 
LCFIs were "the primary private-sector catalysts for 
the destructive credit boom that led to the subprime 
financial crisis, and they [became] the epicenter of 
the current global financial mess."3l Eighteen major 
LCFIs—including ten leading U S financial institutions 
and eight giant foreign banks—^were the dominant 
players in global securities and derivatives markets dur-
ing the credit boom. 32 Those 18 LCFIs included most 
of the top underwriters for nonprime M B S , other types 
of asset-backed securities (ABS) and leveraged buyout 
(LBO) loans, as well as related collateralized debt obUga-
tions (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDS). Although 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fiinded about a fifth of 
the nonprime mortgage market between 2003 and 
2007, they did so primarily by purchasing nonprime 
mortgages and private-label M B S that were originated 
or underwritten by LCFIs . LCFIs provided most o f the 
rest of the fiinding for nonprime home mortgages, as 
well as much of the financing for risky credit card loans, 
commercial real estate ( C R E ) loans and L B O loans.33 
I have estimated that LCFIs were responsible for 
financing about $9 triUion of risky private-sector debt 
that was outstanding i n U S financial markets in 2007 
in the form of nonprime home mortgages, credit card 
loans, C R E loans, L B O loans and junk bonds. Even 
worse, LCFIs underwrote some $25 triUion of struc-
tured-finance securities and derivatives whose value 
depended on the performance of the foregoing risky 
debt, including M B S , A B S , cash flow C D O s , synthetic 
C D O s and C D S . Thus, LCFIs created "an inverted 
pyramid of risk," which allowed investors to place 
"multiple layers of financial bets" on the performance 
of high-risk loans in securitized pools. Consequendy, 
when the underlying loans began to default, the lever-
age inherent in this "pyramid of risk" produced losses 
that were much larger than the face amounts of the 
defaulted loans.34 
The central role of LCFIs in the financial crisis is 
confirmed by the enormous losses they suffered and 
the huge bailouts they received. The "big eighteen" 
LCFIs accounted for three-fifths o f the $1.5 triUion 
of total worldwide losses recorded by banks, securi-
ties firms and insurers between the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in mid-2007 and the spring of 2010.35 
The list o f top LCFIs is "a who's who of the current 
financial crisis" that includes "[m]any of the firpis that 
either went bust . . . or suffered huge write-downs that 
led to significant government intervention."36 Lehman 
failed, while two other members of the "big 18" LCFIs 
(AIG and R B S ) were nationalized and three others 
(Bear, Merr iU and Wachovia) were acquired by other 
LCFIs with substantial governmental assistance. Three 
additional members of the group (Citigroup, B o f A 
and U B S ) survived only because they received cosdy 
government bailouts.37 Chase, Goldman and Morgan: 
Stanley received substantial infusions of T A R P capital, 
and Goldman and Morgan Stanley quickly converted 
to B H C s to secure permanent access to the FRB's dis-
count window as well as "the Fed's public promise o f 
protection."38 
Thus, only Lehman failed of the "big 18" LCFIs , but 
the United States, the United Kingdom and European 
nations provided massive financial assistance to ensure 
the survival of at least twelve other members of the 
group.39 Studies have shown that the T A R P capital 
infusions and F D I C debt guarantees announced i n 
October 2008 represented very large transfers of wealth 
from taxpayers to the shareholders and creditors o f the 
largest U S LCFIs.^O In addition, a recent study con-
cluded that the "below-market rates" charged by the 
Fed on its emergency credit programs produced $13 
biUion of profits for the banks that participated in those 
programs, including $4.8 billion of earnings for the six 
largest U S banks.'" 
Given the major advantages conferred by T B T F 
status, it is not surprising that LCFIs have pursued 
aggressive growth strategies during the past two decades 
to reach a size at which they would be consideredTBTF 
by regulators and the financial markets. Each of today's 
four largest U S banks (Chase, B o f A , Citigroup and Wells 
Fargo) is the product o f serial acquisitions and explo-
sive growth since 1990. BofA's and Citigroup's rapid 
expansions led them to brink of failure, from which 
they were saved by huge federal bailouts. Wachovia (the 
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fourth-largest U S bank at the beginning of the financial 
crisis) pursued a similar path of frenetic growth until it 
collapsed in 2008 and was rescued by Wells Fargo in a 
federally-assisted merger. A comparable pattern of rapid 
expansion, coUapse and bailout occurred among R B S , 
U B S and other European LCFIs.42 
B y arranging and assisting acquisitions of troubled 
L C F I s by major banks, U S regulators have produced 
domestic financial markets in which the largest banks 
en joy an unhealthy dominance. In 2009, the four 
largest U S banks (BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wells 
Fargo) controlled 56 percent of domestic banking 
assets, up from 35 percent in 2000, while the top ten 
U S banks controlled 75 percent of domestic banking 
assets, up from 54 percent in 2000. The four larg-
est banks also controlled a majority of the product 
markets for home mortgages, home equity loans, and 
credit card loans. The same four banks and Goldman 
accounted for 97 percent of the aggregate notional 
values o f O T C derivatives contracts written by U S 
banks.43 
The combined assets o f the six largest banks—the 
foregoing five institutions plus Morgan Stanley—were 
equal to 63 percent of U S G D P in 2009, compared 
w i t h only 17 percent of G D P in 1995.4'^  N o m i Prins 
has observed that, as a result of the financial crisis, "we 
have larger players who are more powerful, who are 
more dependent on government capital and who are 
harder to regulate than they were to begin with."'*5 
Similarly, Simon Johnson and James Kwak maintain that 
"the problem at the heart of the financial system [is] 
the enormous growth of top-tier financial institutions 
and the corresponding increase in their economic and 
pohtical power."46 
Dodd-Frank Does Not 
Solve the TBTF Problem 
The financial crisis has demonstrated that T B T F 
subsidies create dangerous distortions in our financial 
markets and our general economy. Those subsidies must 
be ehminated (or at least significantly reduced) in order 
to restore a more level playing field for smaller financial 
institutions and to encourage the voluntary breakup of 
inefficient, risky financial conglomerates.^*? Accordingly, 
U S and European governments must adopt reforms to 
ensure that effective supervisory and market disciphne 
is appHed against large financial institutions. 
A few months before Dodd-Frank was enacted, I 
wrote an article proposing five key reforms to accom-
pHsh these objectives. M y proposed reforms would have 
(1) strengthened existing statutory restrictions on the 
growth of SIFIs, (2) created a special resolution process 
to manage the orderly hquidation or restructuring o f 
SIFIs, (3) established a consohdated supervisory regime 
and enhanced capital requirements for SIFIs, (4) created 
a special insurance fund to cover the costs of resolving 
failed SIFIs, and (5) rigorously insulated FDIC-insured 
banks that are owned by LCFIs from the activities and 
risks of their nonbank affiHates.48 
The following sections o f this article discuss my pro-
posed reforms and compare those proposals to relevant 
provisions of Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank includes a por-
tion of my first proposal as well as major components o f 
my second and third proposals. However, Dodd-Frank 
omits most of my last two proposals. In my opinion, 
Dodd-Frank's omissions are highly significant and raise 
serious doubts about the statute's abihty to prevent 
T B T F bailouts in the future.A careful reading of D o d d -
Frank indicates that Congress has left the door open for 
taxpayer-funded protection o f creditors of SIFIs during 
future financial crises. 
Dodd-Frank Modesdy Strengthened Existing 
Statutory Limits on the Growth of LCFIs But Did 
Not Close Significant Loopholes 
Congress authorized nationwide banking—^via inter-
state branching and interstate acquisitions of banks 
by BHCs—^when it passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal 
Act).49 To prevent the emergence of dominant mega-
banks, the Riegle-Neal Act imposed nationwide and 
statewide deposit concentration Hmits ("deposit caps") 
on interstate expansion by large banking organizations.^0 
Under the Riegle-Neal Act, a B H C may not acquire a 
bank in another state, and a bank may not merge with 
another bank across state Hues, i f the resulting banking 
organization (together with aU affiHated FDIC-insured 
depository institutions) would hold (i) 10 percent or 
more of the total deposits of aH depository institutions in 
the United States, or (u) 30 percent or more of the total 
deposits of all depository institutions in a single state.^i 
Unfortunately, Riegle-Neal's nationwide and state-
wide deposit caps contained three major loopholes. 
First, the deposit caps appHed only to interstate bank 
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acquisitions and interstate bank mergers, and the 
deposit caps therefore did not restrict combinations 
between banking organizations headquartered in the 
same state. Second, the deposit caps did not apply to 
acquisitions of, or mergers with, thrift institutions and 
industrial banks, because those institutions were not 
treated as "banks" under the Riegle-Neal Act. Third, 
the deposit caps did not apply to acquisitions of, or 
mergers with, banks that were " i n default or in danger 
of default" (the "faihng bank" exception).52 
The emergency acquisitions o f Countrywide, 
Mer r i l l , W a M u and Wachovia in 2008 demonstrated 
the significance of Riegle-Neal's loopholes _ and the 
necessity of closing them. In reliance on the "non-
bank" loophole, the F R B allowed B o f A to acquire 
Countrywide and Mer r i l l even though (i) both firms 
controlled FDIC-insured depository institutions (a 
thrift, in the case of Countrywide, and a thrift and 
industrial bank, in the case of Merr i l l ) , and (u) both 
transactions allowed B o f i \ to exceed the 10 percent 
nationwide deposit cap. Similarly, after the F D I C seized 
control of W a M u as a failed depository institution, the 
F D I C sold the giant thrift to Chase even though the 
transaction enabled Chase to exceed the 10 percent 
nationwide deposit cap. Finally, although the F R B 
determined that Wells Fargo's acquisition of Wachovia 
gave Wells Fargo control of just under 10 percent of 
nationwide deposits, the F R B could have approved the 
acquisition in any case by designating Wachovia as a 
bank " in danger of default."53 
As a result of the foregoing acquisitions, Bof i^ , 
Chase and Wells Fargo each surpassed the 10% nation-
wide deposit cap by October 2008. To prevent fiirther 
breaches of the Riegle-Neal concentration limits, I pro-
posed that Congress should extend the nationwide and 
statewide deposit caps to cover all intrastate and interstate 
transactions involving any type of FDIC-insured deposi-
tory institution, including thrifts and industrial banks. In 
addition, I proposed that Congress should significandy 
narrow the failing bank exception by requiring federal 
regulators to make a "systemic risk determination" 
(SRD) in order to approve any acquisition involving a 
failing depository institution that would exceed either 
the nationwide or statewide deposit caps.54 
Under my proposed standard for an S R D , the 
F R B and the F D I C could not invoke the failing bank 
exception unless they determined jointly, wi th the 
concurrence o f the Treasury Secretary, that the pro-
posed acquisition was necessary to avoid a substantial 
threat of severe systemic injury to the banking system, 
the financial markets or the national economy. In addi-
tion, each S R D would be audited by the Government 
Accountability Ofiice (GAO) to determine whether 
regulators satisfied the criteria for an S R D , and would 
also be reviewed in a joint hearing held by the House 
and Senate committees with oversight of the financial 
markets (the " S R D Review Procedure"). M y proposed 
S R D requirements would ensure much greater public 
transparency of, and scrutiny for, any federal agency 
order that invokes the failing bank exception to the 
Riegle-Neal deposit caps.55 
Section 623 of Dodd-Frank does extend Riegle-
Neal's 10 percent nationwide deposit cap to reach all 
interstate acquisitions and mergers involving any type 
of FDIC-insured depository institution. Thus, interstate 
acquisitions and mergers involving thrift institutions 
and industrial banks are now subject to the nationwide 
deposit cap to the same extent as interstate acquisitions 
and mergers involving commercial banks. However, 
§ 623 leaves open the other Riegle-Neal loopholes 
because (1) it does not apply the nationwide deposit 
cap to intrastate acquisitions or mergers, (2) it does not 
apply the statewide deposit cap to interstate transactions 
involving thrifts or industrial banks or to any type o f 
intrastate transaction, and (3) it does not impose any 
enhanced substantive or procedural requirements for 
invoking the failing bank exception. Hence, § 623 o f 
Dodd-Frank closes one important loophole but fails 
to close other significant exemptions that continue to 
undermine the effectiveness of Riegle-Neal's deposit 
caps.56 
Section 622 o f Dodd-Frank authorizes federal regu-
lators to impose a separate concentration Hmit on 
mergers and acquisitions involving "financial com-
panies." As defined in § 622, the term "financial 
companies" includes insured depository institutions 
and their holding companies, nonbank SIFIs, and 
foreign banks operating in the Uni ted States. Subject 
to two significant exceptions described below, § 622 
potentially bars any acquisition or merger that would 
give a "financial company" control of more than 10 
percent of the total "liabilities" of all financial compa-
nies. This limitation on control of nationwide liabilities 
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("liabilities cap") was originally proposed by former 
F R B Chairman PaulVolcker.57 
T h e HabiHties cap in § 622 provides an additional 
method for restricting the growth of very large finan-
cial companies (e.g., Citigroup, Goldman, and Morgan 
Stanley) that rely mainly on fiinding from the capital 
markets instead o f deposits.^s However, the Habihties 
cap has two significant exceptions. First, it is subject to 
a " fa i l ing bank" exception (similar to the "failing bank" 
loophole in Riegle-Neal), which regulators can invoke 
without making any S R D . Second, and more impor-
tantly, the Habihties cap is not self-executing. Section 
622 requires the Financial Stability Oversight Counci l 
( F S O C ) to consider (based on a cost-benefit analysis) 
whether the statutory HabiHties cap should be modi-
fied. Section 622 also requires the F R B to implement 
the habihties cap i n accordance with any modifications 
recommended by FSOC.^^ 
Thus, § 622 aUows the F S O C and F R B to weaken 
(and perhaps even ehminate) the HabiHties cap i f they 
determine that the cap would have adverse effects 
that outweigh its potential benefits. Consequently, it is 
doubtful whether Dodd-Frank wiU impose any mean-
ingfu l new Hmit on the growth of SIFIs beyond the 
statute's beneficial extension of the nationwide deposit 
cap to reach aU interstate acquisitions and mergers 
involving FDIC-insured institutions. 
Dodd-Frank Establishes a Special 
Resolution Regime for SystemicaUy 
important Financial Institutions But 
Does Not Prevent the FDIC and Other 
Agencies from Protecting Creditors 
of Those institutions 
Dodd-Frank's Orderly Liquidation Authority Allows 
the FDIC to Provide Full Protection for Favored 
Creditors of SIFIs 
Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation 
Authority (OLA) , which seeks to provide a "viable 
alternative to the undesirable choice . . . between bank-
ruptcy o f a large, complex financial company that would 
disrupt markets and damage the economy, and bailout 
of such financial company that would expose taxpayers 
to losses and undermine market discipHne."60 In some 
respects, the O L A for SIFIs—which is similar to the 
FDIC's existing resolution regime for failed depository 
institutions^!—resembles my earHer proposal for a spe-
cial resolution regime for SIFIs.62 However, contrary to 
the statute's stated purpose,^^ Dodd-Frank's O L A does 
not preclude future bailouts for favored creditors of 
T B T F institutions. 
Dodd-Frank estabHshes F S O C as an umbreUa orga-
nization with systemic risk oversight authority. FSOC's 
voting members include the leaders of nine fed-
eral financial regulatory agencies and an independent 
member having insurance experience. B y a two-thirds 
vote, F S O C may determine that a domestic or foreign 
nonbank financial company should be subject to D o d d -
Frank's systemic risk regime, which includes prudential 
supervision by the F R B and potential Hquidation by 
the F D I C under the O L A . In deciding whether to 
impose Dodd-Frank's systemic risk regime on a non-
bank financial company, the crucial question to be 
decided by F S O C is whether "material financial distress 
at the . . . nonbank financial company, or the nature, 
scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or 
mix o f the activities of the . . . nonbank financial com-
pany, could pose a threat to the financial stabihty of the 
Uni ted Sutes."64 
Dodd-Frank does not use the term "systemicaUy 
important financial institution" to describe a nonbank 
financial company that is subject to the statute's sys-
temic risk regime, but I wUl generaUy refer to such 
companies as nonbank SIFIs. Dodd-Frank treats B H C s 
with assets of more than $50 bUHon as SIFIs, and those 
B H C s are also subject to enhanced supervision by the 
F R B and potential hquidation by the F D I C under the 
OLA . 65 Dodd-Frank properly recognizes that—absent 
mandatory breakups of LCFIs—the best way to impose 
efiective disciphne on SIFIs, and to reduce the federal 
subsidies they receive, is to designate them pubhcly as 
SIFIs and to impose stringent regulatory requirements 
that force them to internahze the potential costs of 
their T B T F status.^^ However, it is noteworthy—and 
disturbing—that F S O C has not yet pubHcly designated 
any large nonbank financial firm as a nonbank SIFI, 
even though more than 18 months have gone by since 
Dodd-Frank's enactment. 
As I and many others have proposed. Article II of 
Dodd-Frank estabHshes a systemic resolution process— 
the O L A — t o handle the faUures of SIFIs.67 In order 
to invoke the O L A for a "covered financial company," 
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the Treasury Secretary must issue an S R D , based 
on the recommendation of the F R B together with 
either the F D I C or the S E C (if the failing company's 
largest subsidiary is a securities broker or dealer) or the 
Federal Insurance OfEce (if the faihng company's larg-
est subsidiary is an insurance company). The Treasury 
Secretary's S R D must f ind that (i) the covered finan-
cial company's failure and resolution under otherwise 
apphcable insolvency rules (e.g, the federal bankruptcy 
laws) would have "serious adverse effects on financial 
stability," (ii) apphcation of the O L A would "avoid 
or mitigate such adverse effects," and (iii) "no viable 
private sector alternative is available to prevent" the 
company's failure. 
I have argued that the systemic resolution process 
for SIFIs should embody three core principles in order 
to create a close similarity between that process and 
Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. Those 
core principles are: (A) requiring equity owners in a 
failed SIFI to lose their entire investment i f the SIFI's 
assets are insufficient to pay all vahd creditor claims, (B) 
removing senior managers and other employees who 
were responsible for the SIFI's failure, and (C) requiring 
unsecured creditors to accept meaningful "haircuts" in 
the form of significant reductions of their debt claims 
or an exchange of substantial portions of their debt 
claims for equity in a successor institution. 
Dodd-Frank incorporates the first two of my core 
principles. It requires the F D I C to ensure that equity 
owners of a failed SIFI do not receive any payment 
until all creditor claims are paid, and that managers 
responsible for the failure are removed. A t first sight, 
Dodd-Frank also seems to embody the third principle 
by directing the F D I C to impose losses on unsecured 
creditors i f a failed SIFI's assets are insufficient to pay all 
secured and unsecured debts. However, a careful read-
ing of the statute reveals that Dodd-Frank allows the 
F D I C to provide fuU protection to favored classes of 
unsecured creditors of failed SIFIs. 
In its capacity as receiver for a failed SIFI, the F D I C 
may provide funds for the payment or transfer of credi-
tors' claims in at least two ways. First, the F D I C may 
provide funding direcdy to the SIFI's receivership estate 
by making loans, purchasing or guaranteeing assets, or 
assuming or guaranteeing habiUties. Second, the F D I C 
may provide funding to estabhsh a "bridge financial 
company" (BFC), and the F D I C may then approve 
a transfer of designated assets and habihties from the 
failed SIFI to the B F C . In either case, the F D I C may 
(i) take steps to "mitigate[] the potential for serious 
adverse effects to the financial system," and (ii) provide 
preferential treatment to certain creditors i f the F D I C 
determines that such treatment is necessary to "maxi-
mize" the value of a failed SIFI's assets or to preserve 
"essential" operations of the SIFI or a successor B F C . 
Subject to the foregoing conditions, the F D I C may 
give preferential treatment to certain creditors as long 
as every creditor receives at least the amount she would 
have recovered in a hquidation proceeding under 
Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.^i 
In October 2010, the F D I C issued a proposed rule 
to implement its authority under the O L A . The F D I C 
subsequendy approved an interim final O L A rule?^ 
and a final O L A rule.?3 Under the O L A rule, the 
F D I C may provide preferential treatment to certain 
creditors in order "to continue key operations, ser-
vices, and transactions that wi l l maximize the value of 
the [failed SIFI's] assets and avoid a disorderly collapse 
in the marketplace."?^ The O L A rule excludes the 
following classes of creditors f rom any possibility o f 
preferential treatment: (i) holders o f unsecured senior 
debt with a term of more than 360 days, and (u) 
holders of subordinated debt. Accordingly, the O L A 
rule would allow the F D I C to provide fuU protection 
to short-term, unsecured creditors o f a failed SIFI 
whenever the F D I C determines that such protection 
is "essential for [the SIFI's] continued operation and 
orderly Hquidation."''^ 
The O L A rule would allow the F D I C to give fuU 
protection to short-term HabiHties of SIFIs, including 
commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements. 
Those types of wholesale Habihties proved to be highly 
volatile and prone to creditor "runs" during the financial 
crisis.?^ Unfortunately, by stating that the F D I C reserves 
the right to provide preferential treatment to short-term 
creditors of failed SIFIs, but wiU never provide such 
treatment to holders of long-term debt or subordinated 
debt, the O L A rule is Hkely have at least two perverse 
effects. The O L A rule (i) creates the appearance of an 
impHcit subsidy to short-term creditors of SIFIs, and (ii) 
encourages SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulner-
able, short-term funding strategies that led to repeated 
disasters during the financial crisis.?? 
Volume 31 • Number 3 • March 2012 Banking 8c Financial Services Policy Report • 9 
A s indicated by the O L A rule, Dodd-Frank gives 
the F D I C considerable leeway to provide de facto 
bailouts for favored creditors of failed SIFIs. Dodd-
Frank also provides a funding source for such bailouts. 
Section 201 (n) of Dodd-Frank estabHshes an Orderly 
Liquidat ion Fund (OLF) to finance hquidations of 
SIFIs. As discussed below, Dodd-Frank does not estab-
hsh a pre-fiinding mechanism for the O L E However, 
the F D I C may obtain funds for the O L F by borrowing 
f rom the Treasury in amounts up to (i) 10 percent of 
a failed SIFI's assets within thirty days after the FDIC's 
appointment as receiver, plus (ii) 90 percent of the "fair 
value" o f the SIFI's assets that are "available for repay-
ment" thereafter.?8 The FDIC's authority to borrow 
f rom the Treasury provides an immediate source of 
funding to protect unsecured creditors that are deemed 
to have systemic significance. In addition, the "fair 
value" standard potentiaUy gives the F D I C considerable 
discretion in appraising the assets o f a failed SIFI, since 
the "fair value" standard does not require the F D I C to 
rely on current market values in measuring the value of 
a failed SIFI's assets. 
Dodd-Frank generally requires the F D I C to impose 
a "claw-back" on creditors who receive preferential 
treatment i f the proceeds of Hquidating a failed SIFI are 
insufficient to repay the full amount that the F D I C has 
borrowed from the Treasury to finance the hquidation. 
However, Dodd-Frank authorizes the F D I C to exercise 
its powers under the O L A (including its authority to 
provide preferential treatment to favored creditors of a 
failed SIFI) for the purpose of preserving "the financial 
stabihty o f the Uni ted States" and preventing "serious 
adverse effects to the financial system."^'' Therefore, 
the F D I C could conceivably assert the power to waive 
its right of "claw-back" against a failed SIFI's creditors 
who received preferential treatment i f the F D I C deter-
mines that such a waiver is necessary to maintain the 
stabihty o f the financial markets. 
Dodd-Frank Does Not Prevent Federal 
Regulators from Using Other Sources of 
Funding to Protect Creditors of SIFIs 
Dodd-Frank could potentially be interpreted as 
allowing the F D I C to borrow an additional $100 bU-
Hon from the Treasury for use in accompHshing the 
orderly Hquidation o f a failed SIFI. Dodd-Frank states 
that the FDIC's borrowing authority for the O L F does 
not "affect" the FDIC's authority to borrow from the 
Treasury Department under 12 U.S .C . § 1824(a).§2 
Under §1824(a), the F D I C may exercise its "judgment" 
to borrow up to $100 bUHon from the Treasury "for 
insurance purposes," and the term "insurance purposes" 
appears to include functions beyond the FDIC's respon-
sibihty to administer the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) 
for banks and thrifts.83 Dodd-Frank bars the F D I C 
from using the DIF to assist the O L F or from using 
the O L F to assist the DIE^^ However, the F D I C could 
conceivably assert that it has authority to borrow up to 
$100 biUion from the Treasury under § 1824(a) for the 
"insurance purpose" of financing an orderly hquida-
tion of a SIFI outside the normal funding parameters of 
the OLF. Assuming that such supplemental borrowing 
authority is avaUable to the F D I C , the F D I C could use 
that authority to protect a SIFI's uninsured and unse-
cured creditors as long as such protection "maximizes" 
the value of the SIFI's assets or "mitigates the potential 
for serious adverse effects to the financial system."^^ 
The "systemic risk exception" (SRE) to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) provides a further 
potential source of funding to protect creditors of faUed 
SIFIs.86 Under the S R E , the Treasury Secretary can 
authorize the F D I C to provide fiiU protection to unin-
sured creditors of a bank in order to avoid or mitigate 
"serious effects on economic conditions or finan-
cial stabihty.''^? Dodd-Frank amended and narrowed 
the S R E by requiring that a bank must be placed in 
receivership in order for the bank's creditors to receive 
extraordinary protection under the SRE.^^ Thus, i f a 
faUing SIFI owned a bank that was placed in receiver-
ship, the S R E would permit the F D I C (with the FRB's 
concurrence and the Treasury Secretary's approval) to 
provide fuU protection to creditors of that bank in order 
to avoid or mitigate systemic risk. B y protecting a SIFI-
owned bank's creditors (which could include the SIFI 
itself), the F D I C could use the S R E to provide indirect 
support to the SIFI or its creditors. 
Two provisions o f Dodd-Frank Hmit the authority 
of the F R B and the F D I C to provide financial support 
to faUing SIFIs or their subsidiary banks outside the 
O L A or the S R E . First, §1101 o f Dodd-Frank provides 
that the F R B may not extend emergency secured loans 
under §13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act^^ except to 
solvent firms that are "participant[s] in any program 
or facihty with broad-based ehgibUity" that has been 
approved by the Treasury Secretary and reported to 
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Congress.90 Second, § 1105 of Dodd-Frank forbids the 
F D I C from guaranteeing debt obUgations of depository 
institutions or their holding companies or other afBh-
ates except pursuant to a "widely available program" 
for "solvent" institutions that has been approved by the 
Treasury Secretary and endorsed by a joint resolution 
of Congress.91 
In Hght of the foregoing constraints, it is difficult 
to envision how the F R B or the F D I C could provide 
loans or debt guarantees to individual faihng SIFIs 
or their subsidiary banks under § 1101 or § 1105 of 
Dodd-Frank.92 However, the F R B could conceivably 
use its remaining authority under § 13(3) to create a 
"broad-based" program similar to the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facihty (PDCF) in order to provide emergency 
Hquidity assistance to a selected group of SIFIs that the 
F R B deems to be "solvent."^^ As shown by the events 
of 2008, it is extremely difficult for outsiders (includ-
ing members of Congress) to second-guess a regulator's 
determination of solvency in the midst of a systemic 
crisis. Moreover, regulators are strongly incHned dur-
ing a crisis to make generous assessments of solvency 
in order to justify their decision to provide emergency 
assistance to troubled SIFIs.94 Thus, during a financial 
crisis the F P ^ could potentiaUy assert its authority 
under amended § 13(3) to provide emergency loans to 
a targeted group of troubled SIFIs that it identified as 
"solvent." 
Moreover, Dodd-Frank does not Hmit the abU-
ity of individual SIFIs to receive Hquidity support 
from the FRB's discount window or from Federal 
Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). The F B ^ ' s discount 
window (often referred to as the FRB's "lender of last 
resort" facUity) provides short-term loans to depository 
institutions secured by quahfying coUateral. Sinularly, 
FHLBs—sometimes described as "lender[s] of next-to-
last resort"—provide coUateraHzed advances to member 
institutions, including banks and insurance companies.95 
During the financial crisis, banks did not borrow 
significant amounts from the discount window due 
to (i) the perceived "stigma" of doing so and (ii) the 
avaUabUity of alternative sources of credit through 
F H L B s and several emergency Hquidity facUities that 
the F R B estabhshed under its § 13(3) authority The 
F H L B s provided $235 bUHon of advances to member 
institutions during the second half of 2007, foUowing 
the outbreak of the financial crisis. Dur ing that period, 
F H L B s extended almost $150 bUHon of advances to ten 
major LCFIs . Six of those LCFIs incurred large losses 
during the crisis and faUed, were acquired in emergency 
transactions, or received "exceptional assistance" from 
the federal government. Accordingly, F H L B advances 
provided a significant source of support for troubled 
LCFIs , especiaUy during the early phase of the financial 
crisis. Dur ing fliture crises, it seems Hkely that indi -
vidual LCFIs wUl use the FRB's discount window more 
frequendy, along with F H L B advances, because D o d d-
Frank prevents the F R B from providing emergency 
credit to individual institutions under § 13(3).96 
Discount window loans and F H L B advances cannot 
be made to banks in receivership, but they do provide a 
potential source of funding for troubled SIFIs or SIFI-
owned banks as long as that funding is extended prior 
to the appointment of a receiver for either the bank or 
the SIFI. To the extent that the F R B or F H L B s provide 
such fiinding, at least some short-term creditors of 
troubled SIFIs or SIFI-owned banks are hkely to benefit 
by obtaining fuU payment of their claims before any 
receivership is created.^? 
Thus, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank's expHcit prom-
ise to end baUouts of SIFIs, federal agencies retain 
several powers that wiU permit them to protect creditors 
of weakened SIFIs. A more fiindamental problem is that 
Dodd-Frank's "no baUout" pledge does not bind future 
Congresses. When a fliture Congress confronts the next 
systemic financial crisis, that Congress may weU decide 
to abandon Dodd-Frank's "no baUout" position either 
expHcidy (by amending or repeahng the statute) or 
imphcidy (by looking the other way while regulators 
expansively construe their authority to protect creditors 
of SIFIs). For example, Congress and President George 
H . W Bush made "never again" statements when they 
rescued the thrift industry with taxpayer funds in 1989. 
However, those statements did not prevent Congress 
and President George W. Bush from using pubhc funds 
to baU out major financial institutions in 2008.^8 As 
Adam Levitin has observed: 
Law is an insufficient commitment device for 
avoiding baUouts altogether. It is impossible to 
produce binding commitment to a preset resolu-
tion process, irrespective of the results. The finan-
cial Ulysses cannot be bound to the mast Once 
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the ship is foundering, we do not want Ulysses to 
be bound to the mast, lest [we] go down with the 
ship and drown. Instead, we want to be sure his 
hands are free—to bail.^^ 
Levi t in predicts that future Congresses wi l l relax or 
remove Dodd-Frank's constraints on T B T F bailouts, or 
w i l l permit federal regulators to evade those Hmitations, 
i f such actions are deemed necessary to prevent failures 
o f SIFIs that could destabihze our financial system.!™ 
Chery l Block has similarly concluded that "despite 
aU the . . . 'no more taxpayer-funded bailout' clamor 
included in recent financial reform legislation, bailouts 
i n the future are Hkely i f circumstances become suf-
ficiendy severe."!Oi Based on comparable reasoning. 
Standard & Poor's (S&P) determined in July 2011 
that "under certain circumstances and with selected 
systemicaUy important financial institutions, future 
extraordinary government support is still possible."i02 
Dodd-Frank Subjects SIFIs to Enhanced Supervisory 
Standards, But Those Provisions Are Not Likely to 
Prevent Future Bailouts of SIFIs 
Dodd-Frank provides the F R B with consohdated 
supervision and enforcement authority over nonbank 
SIFIs comparable to the FRB's umbreUa supervisory and 
enforcement powers over B H C s and financial holding 
companies (FHCs). Dodd-Frank also requires the F R B 
(either on its own motion or on FSOC's recommenda-
tion) to adopt enhanced prudential standards for nonbank 
SIFIs and large B H C s "[i]n order to prevent or mitigate 
risks to the financial stability of the United States ."i 03 The 
enhanced standards must be "more stringent" than the 
ordinary supervisory rules that apply to nonbank finan-
cial companies and B H C s that are not SIFIs. 
For example, Dodd-Frank requires the F R B to adopt 
enhanced risk-based capital requirements, leverage 
hmits, Hquidity requirements, overaU risk management 
rules, risk concentration Hmits, requirements for resolu-
tion plans ("Hving wUls") and credit exposure reports. 
In addition, the F R B may, in its discretion, require SIFIs 
to satisfy contingent capital requirements, enhanced 
pubhc disclosures, short-term debt Hmits, and additional 
prudential standards. 
Dodd-Frank's provisions requiring consolidated 
F R B supervision and enhanced prudential standards 
for SIFIs represent valuable improvements. For at least 
five reasons, however, those provisions are unHkely to 
prevent fumre faUures of SIFIs with the attendant risk 
of governmental baUouts for systemicaUy significant 
creditors. First, Hke previous regulatory reforms, D o d d-
Frank rehes heavUy on the concept of stronger capital 
requirements. Unfortunately, capital-based regulation 
has repeatedly faUed in the past.^o^ As regulators learned 
during the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, capital levels are "lagging indicators" of 
bank problems^"'' because (i) "many assets held by 
banks . . . are not traded on any organized market and, 
therefore, are very difficult for regulators and outside 
investors to value," and (ii) bank managers "have strong 
incentives to postpone any recognition of asset depre-
ciation and capital losses" untU their banks have already 
suffered serious damage. 
Second, LCFIs have repeatedly demonstrated their 
abihty to engage in "regulatory capital arbitrage" in 
order to weaken the effectiveness o f capital require-
ments.109 example, the Basel II international capital 
accord was designed to prevent arbitrage techniques 
(including securitization) that banks used to undermine 
the effectiveness of the Basel I accord, However, 
many analysts have concluded that the Basel II accord 
(including its heavy rehance on internal risk-based 
models developed by LCFIs) contained significant flaws 
and aUowed LCFIs to operate with seriously inadequate 
capital levels during the period leading up to the finan-
cial crisis, m 
Third, the past shortcomings of capital-based rules 
are part o f a broader phenomenon of supervisory faU-
ure. Regulators did not stop large banks from pursuing 
hazardous (and in many cases fatal) strategies during 
the 1980s, including rapid growth with heavy concen-
trations in high-risk assets and excessive rehance on 
volatUe, short-term HabiHties. Dur ing the 1980s, regu-
lators proved to be unwUHng or unable to stop risky 
behavior as long as banks continued to report profits.^^^ 
Sinularly, there is widespread agreement that federal 
banking and securities regulators faUed to restrain 
excessive risk-taking by LCFIs during the two decades 
leading up to the financial crisis. ^  13 
Fourth, repeated regulatory faUures during past 
financial crises reflect a "pohtical economy of regula-
tion"ii4 in which regulators face significant pohtical 
12 • Banking & Fmandal Services Policy Report Volume 31 • Number 3 • March 2012 
and practical challenges that undermine their efforts to 
disciphne LGFIs. A fuU discussion of those challenges 
is beyond the scope of this testimony. For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to note that analysts have pointed 
to strong evidence o f "capture" of financial regulatory 
agencies by LCFIs during the two decades leading up 
to the financial crisis, due to factors such as (i) large 
pohtical contributions and lobbying expenditures made 
by LCFIs, (ii) an intellectual and poUcy environment 
favoring deregulation, and (iii) a continuous inter-
change of senior personnel between the largest financial 
institutions and the top echelons of the financial regu-
latory agenc ies .Commenta tors have also noted that 
LCFIs skillfully engaged in global regulatory arbitrage 
by threatening to move operations from the United 
States to London or other foreign financial centers i f 
U S regulators did not make regulatory concessions. 
Fifth, Dodd-Frank does not provide specific instruc-
tions about the higher capital requirements and other 
enhanced prudential standards that the F R B must 
adopt. Instead, Dodd-Frank sets forth general categories 
of supervisory requirements that the F R B either must 
or may address.Thus, the actual achievement of stronger 
prudential standards wiU depend upon implementa-
tion by the F R B through rulemaking, and LCFIs have 
marshaled an imposing array of lobbying resources to 
persuade the F R B to adopt more lenient rules.H-'When 
Congress passed Dodd-Frank, the head o f a leading Wall 
Street trade association declared that "[t]he bottom hne 
is that this saga wiU continue," and he noted that there 
are "more than 200 items in [Dodd-Frank]l where final 
details wiU be left up to regulators.""^ Domestic and 
foreign LCFIs have already succeeded in weakening and 
delaying the imposition o f enhanced capital standards 
under the Basel III accord, and they are determined to 
prevent U S regulators from adopting stronger capital 
requirements that would go beyond Basel III .H' 
For all o f the foregoing reasons, as John Coffee has 
noted, "the intensity of regulatory supervision is hkely 
to follow a sine curve: tight regulation after a crash, f o l -
lowed by gradual relaxation thereafter" as the economy 
improves and the crisis fades in the memories of regula-
tors and the pubhc.120 When the next economic boom 
occurs, regulators wi l l face escalating pohtical pressures 
to reduce the regulatory burdens on LCFIs in order to 
help those institutions continue to finance the boom. 
If an unsustainable boom triggers a severe financial and 
economic crisis, a different set of pohtical factors wiU 
push regulators and legislators to provide forbearance 
and bailouts to SIFIs and their creditors. Accordingly, 
while Dodd-Frank's provisions for stronger supervision 
and enhanced prudential standards represent improve-
ments over prior law, they are unhkely to prevent future 
failures of SIFIs and governmental protection o f sys-
temicaUy important creditors.i^l 
Dodd-Frank Does Not Require SIFIs to Pay 
Insurance Premiums to Pre-Fund the Orderly 
Liquidation Fund 
As noted above, Dodd-Frank estabHshes an Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF) to provide financing for the 
FDIC's Hquidation of faUed SIFIs. However, D o d d -
Frank does not require LCFIs to pay any assessments 
to pre-fund the OLF. Instead, Dodd-Frank authorizes 
the F D I C to borrow from the Treasury to provide the 
necessary funding for the O L F after a SIFI is placed i n 
receivers hip.122 
The F D I C must normaUy repay any borrowings 
from the Treasury within five years, but the Treasury 
may extend the repayment period in order "to avoid 
a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the 
United States."i23 Dodd-Frank authorizes the F D I C to 
repay borrowings from the Treasury by making ex post 
assessments on (i) creditors who received preferential 
payments (to the extent of such preferences), (ii) non-
bank SIFIs supervised by the F R B under Dodd-Frank, 
(iii) B H C s with assets of $50 bUHon or more, and (iii) 
other financial companies with assets of $50 bUHon or 
more. 124 
Thus, Dodd-Frank rehes on an ex post fiinding sys-
tem for financing Hquidations of SIFIs.That was not the 
case with early versions of the legislation. The financial 
reform bil l passed by the House of Representatives 
would have authorized the F D I C to pre-fund the 
O L F by coUecting up to $150 bUHon in risk-based 
assessments from nonbank SIFIs and large B H C s . The 
bUl reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs would also have estabhshed 
a pre-funded OLF, albeit with a smaUer "target size" o f 
$50 biUion. F D I C Chairman SheUa Bair strongly cham-
pioned the concept of a pre-funded OLF. 125 
However, Senate Repubhcans repeatedly blocked 
consideration of the financial reform biU by the 
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fu l l Senate until Senate Democratic leaders agreed 
to remove the pre-funding provision. The Obama 
Administration never supported the pre-funding mech-
anism and urged Senate leaders to remove it from the 
bUl. Dur ing the House-Senate conference committee's 
dehberations on Dodd-Frank, House Democratic con-
ferees tried to revive the pre-funding mechanism but 
their efforts failed.i26 
It is contrary to customary insurance principles to 
estabhsh an O L F that is funded only after a SIFI fails 
and must be Hquidated.127 When commentators have 
considered analogous insurance issues created by the 
DIF, they have recognized that moral hazard is reduced 
when banks pay risk-based premiums that compel "each 
bank [to] bear the cost of its own risk-taking." N o 
one advocates a post-funded D I F today; indeed, analysts 
have generally argued that the D I F needs a higher level 
o f pre-funding in order to respond adequately to sys-
temic banking crises. 
In stark contrast to the F D I Ac t—which requires 
banks to pay deposit insurance premiums to pre-fund 
the DIF—Dodd-Frank does not require SIFIs to pay 
risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF. As a result, 
SIFIs receive an imphcit subsidy, and they benefit from 
lower funding costs due to the protection their credi-
tors expect to receive from the Treasury-backed O L E 
SIFIs win pay nothing for that subsidy until the first 
SIFI fads. 130 No t surprisingly, leading financial institu-
tions viewed the removal of O L F pre-funding from the 
Dodd-Frank Act as a significant "victory," because it 
reheved them of the burden of paying an "upfront fee" 
to cover the potential costs of their imphcit subsidy, i^i 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
Dodd-Frank would produce a ten-year net budget 
deficit o f $19 bilhon, due primarily to "potential net 
oudays for the orderly hquidation of [SIFIs], measured 
on an expected value basis."i32 To offset that deficit, 
the House-Senate conferees on Dodd-Frank proposed 
a $19 biUion tax on financial companies with assets of 
$50 biUion or more and on hedge funds with man-
aged assets of $10 biUion or more. LCFIs strongly 
objected to the tax, and Repubhcans who had voted 
for the Senate biU threatened to block final passage o f 
the legislation unless the tax was removed. To ensure 
Dodd-Frank's passage, the House-Senate conference 
committee reconvened and removed the $19 biUion tax 
whUe substituting other measures that effectively shifted 
most of the legislation's estimated net cost to taxpayers 
and midsized banks. 133 
Thus, LCFIs and their aUies were successful i n 
defeating the $19 biUion tax as weU as the pre-funded 
OLF. As I observed in a contemporaneous blog post, 
"[t]he biggest banks have once again proven their 
pohtical c l o u t . . . [and] have also avoided any significant 
payment for the subsidies they continue to receive."i34 
A pre-funded O L F is essential to shrink T B T F sub-
sidies for LCFIs . The F D I C should assess risk-adjusted 
premiums over a period of several years to estabhsh a 
pre-funded O L F with financial resources that would 
provide reasonable protection to taxpayers against the 
cost o f resolving faUures of SIFIs during a future sys-
temic financial crisis. As noted above, federal regulators 
provided $290 biUion of capital assistance to the 19 
largest BHCs—each with assets of more than $100 
biUion—and to A I G during the current crisis. 
Accordingly, $300 biUion (appropriately adjusted for 
inflation) would be the minimum acceptable size for a 
pre-fimded O L E O L F premiums should be paid by aU 
B H C s with assets of more than $100 biUion (also adjusted 
for inflation) and by aU designated nonbank SIFIs. The 
F D I C should impose additional assessments on SIFIs in 
order to replenish the O L F within three years after the 
O L F incurs any loss due to the faUure of a SIFI.135 
There are four essential reasons why Congress 
should amend Dodd-Frank to require SIFIs to pay risk-
based insurance premiums to pre-fund the OLF. First, it 
is unhkely that most SIFIs would have adequate finan-
cial resources to pay large O L F assessments after one or 
more of their peers faded during a financial crisis. SIFIs 
are frequently exposed to highly correlated risk expo-
sures during a serious financial disruption, because they 
foUowed simUar high-risk business strategies ("herd-
ing") during the credit boom that led to the crisis. 
Many SIFIs are therefore hkely to suffer severe losses 
and to face a substantial risk of faUure during a major 
disturbance in the financial markets. Consequently, (i) 
the F D I C probably wiU not be able in the short term 
to coUect enough premiums from surviving SIFIs to 
cover the costs of resolving one or more faUed SIFIs, 
and (u) the F D I C therefore wiU have to borrow large 
sums from the Treasury to cover short-term resolution 
costs. Even i f the F D I C ultimately repays the borrowed 
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funds by imposing ex post assessments on surviving 
SIFIs, the pubhc and the financial markets wi l l righdy 
conclude that the federal government (and, ultimately, 
the taxpayers) provided bridge loans to pay the creditors 
of failed SlFIs.136 
Second, under Dodd-Frank's post-funded OLF, the 
most reckless SIFIs w i l l effectively shift the potential 
costs of their risk-taking to more prudent SIFIs, because 
the latter wiU be more hkely to survive and bear the ex 
post costs of resolving their failed peers. Thus, a post-
funded O L F is undesirable because "firms that fail never 
pay and the costs are borne by surviving firms."l37 
Third, a pre-funded O L F would encourage each SIFI 
to monitor other SIFIs and to alert regulators to exces-
sive risk-taking by those institutions. Every SIFI would 
know that the failure of another SIFI would deplete the 
O L F and would also trigger future assessments that it 
and other surviving SIFIs would have to pay. Thus, each 
SIFI would have good reason to complain to regulators 
i f it became aware o f unsound practices or conditions 
at another SIFI.138 
Fourth, the payment of risk-based assessments to 
pre-fund the O L F would reduce T B T F subsidies for 
SIFIs by forcing them to internahze more of the "nega-
tive externahty" (i.e., the potential public bailout cost) 
of their activities. A pre-funded O L F would provide 
a reserve fund, paid for by SIFIs, which would shield 
governments and taxpayers from having to incur the 
expense of underwriting future resolutions of failed 
SIFIs. Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher MuUer point 
out that a pre-funded O L F would also reduce the 
T B T F subsidy by making Dodd-Frank's "hquidation 
threat more credible."i40 In their view, a pre-funded 
O L F would encourage regulators to mandate an O L A 
receivership for a faihng SIFI.i^i In contrast, D o d d -
Frank's post-flinded O L F creates a strong incentive for 
regulators to grant forbearance in order to postpone 
(and hopefully avoid) an O L A receivership, because 
such a receivership would involve the politically 
unpopular step of borrowing from the Treasury in order 
to finance a failed SIFI's hquidation. 
To further reduce the potential T B T F subsidy for 
SIFIs, the O L F should be strictly separated from the 
DIF, which insures bank deposits. As discussed above, 
the S R E in the F D I Act is a potential source of 
bailout funds for SIFI-owned banks, and those funds 
could indirecdy support creditors of SIFIs.1^3 Congress 
should repeal the S R E and should designate the O L F 
as the exclusive source of future funding for all resolu-
tions of failed SIFIs. B y repeahng the S R E , Congress 
would ensure that (i) the F D I C must apply the F D I 
Act's least-cost test in resolving all future bank failures, 
(ii) the D I F must be used solely to pay the claims o f 
bank depositors, and (iii) non-deposit creditors o f SIFIs 
could no longer view the D I F as a potential source o f 
financial support. B y making those changes. Congress 
would significandy reduce the imphcit T B T F subsidy 
currendy enjoyed by SIFIs. 
The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Prevent Financial 
Holding Companies from Using Federal Safety Net 
Subsidies to Support Risky Nonbanking Activities 
Dodd-Frank contains three sections that are intended 
to prevent the federal "safety net" for banksi^s f rom 
being used to support risky nonbanking activities con-
nected to the capital markets. None of those sections is 
hkely to be effective. The first provision (the Kanjorski 
Amendment) is unwieldy and constrained by stringent 
procedural requirements.The other two provisions (the 
Volcker Ru le and the Lincoln Amendment) are riddled 
with loopholes and have long phase-in periods. In 
addition, the implementation of all three provisions is 
subject to broad regulatory discretion and is therefore 
hkely to be influenced by aggressive industry lobbying. 
The Kanjorski Amendment 
Section 121 o f Dodd-Frank, the "Kanjorsk i 
Amendment," was originally sponsored by 
Representative Paul Kanjorski. Section 121 provides 
the F R B with potential authority to require large 
B H C s (with more than $50 bilhon of assets) or non-
bank SIFIs to divest high-risk operations. However, 
the F R B may exercise its divestiture authority under 
§ 121 only i f (i) the B H C or nonbank SIFI "poses 
a grave threat to the financial stabihty of the Uni ted 
States" and (ii) the F R ^ ' s proposed action is approved 
by at least two-thirds of FSOC's voting members.i46 
Additionally, the F R B may not exercise its divestiture 
authority unless it has previously attempted to "mi t i -
gate" the threat posed by the B H C or nonbank SIFI by 
taking several less drastic remedial m e a s u r e s . I f , and 
only if, the FKB determines that all of those remedial 
measures are "inadequate to mitigate [the] threat," the 
F R B may then exercise its residual authority to "require 
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the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or ofiF-
balance-sheet items to unafhhated parties/'^^S 
The FRB's divestiture authority under § 121 is thus 
a last resort, and it is restricted by numerous proce-
dural requirements (including, most notably, approval 
b y a two-thirds vote of F S O C ). The Bank Holding 
Company Act ( " B H C Act") contains a similar provi-
sion, under which the F R B can force a B H C to divest 
a nonbank subsidiary that "constitutes a serious risk to 
the financial safety, soundness or stabihty" of any of the 
B H C s banking subsidiaries.^^? J h e F R B may exercise 
its divestiture authority under the B H C Act without 
the concurrence of any other federal agency, and the 
F R B is not required to take any intermediate remedial 
steps before requiring a divestiture. However, according 
to a senior Federal Reserve official, the FRB's dives-
titure authority under the B H C Act "has never been 
successfully used for a major banking organization."i50 
In view of the much more stringent procedural and 
substantive constraints on the FRB's authority under 
the Kanjorski Amendment, the prospects for an F R B -
ordered breakup of a SIFI seem remote at best. 
The Volcker Rule 
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, the "Volcker Rule ," 
was originally proposed by former F R B Chairman 
Paul Volcker. As approved by the Senate Banking 
Committee, the Volcker Ru le would have gener-
ally barred banks and B H C s from (i) sponsoring or 
investing in hedge funds or private equity funds and 
(ii) engaging in proprietary trading—^i.e., buying and 
seUing securities, derivatives and other tradable assets 
for their own account. Thus, the Volcker Rule sought 
to prohibit equity investments and trading activities by 
banks and B H C s except for "market making" activities 
conducted on behalf of chents.i52 
The Senate committee report explained that the 
Volcker Rule would prevent banks "protected by the 
federal safety net, which have a lower cost of funds, 
f rom directing those funds to high-risk uses."i53 
The report endorsed M r . Volcker's view that pubhc 
pohcy does not favor having "pubhc fiinds—taxpayer 
funds—^protecting and supporting essentially propri-
etary and speculative activities."i54 The report further 
declared that the Volcker Ru le was directed at"hmiting 
the inappropriate transfer o f economic subsidies" by 
banks and "reducing inappropriate conflicts of interest 
between [banks] and their afiihates."i55Thus, the Senate 
report made clear that a primary goal of the Volcker 
Rule was to prevent banks from spreading their federal 
safety net subsidies to nonbank affihates engaged in 
capital markets activities. 
LCFIs vehemendy opposed the Volcker Rule as 
embodied in the Senate committee bill.i56 However, 
the Volcker Rule—and the financial reform bill as a 
whole—gained significant pohtical momentum from 
two events related to Goldman. First, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a lawsuit on 
A p r i l 16, 2010, alleging that Goldman defrauded two 
institutional purchasers o f interests in a C D O that 
Goldman structured and marketed. The S E C charged 
that Goldman did not disclose to the C D O ' s investors 
that a large hedge fiind, Paulson & Co. , helped to select 
the C D O ' s portfoho o f M B S while intending to short 
the C D O by purchasing C D S from Goldman.The S E C 
alleged that Goldman knew, and did not disclose, that 
Paulson & Co . had an economic incentive to select 
M B S that it expected to default within the near-term 
future. The institutional investors in the C D O lost 
more than $1 biUion, whUe Paulson & Co . reaped a 
corresponding gain. Goldman subsequendy setded the 
SEC's lawsuit by paying restitution and penalties o f 
$550 mUhon.157 
Second, on AprU 27, 2010, the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Oversight interrogated Goldman's 
chairman and several of Goldman's other current and 
former officers during an eleven-hour hearing. The 
Subcommittee also released a report charging, based on 
internal Goldman documents, that Goldman aggres-
sively sold nonprime mortgage-backed investments 
to cHents in late 2006 and 2007 whUe Goldman was 
"making huge and profitable bets against the housing 
market and acting against the interest of its chents."The 
allegations against Goldman presented in the SEC's 
lawsuit and at the Senate hearing provoked widespread 
pubhc outrage and gave a major pohtical boost to the 
Volcker Ru le and the reform legislation as a whole. 
Nevertheless, large financial institutions contin-
ued their aggressive lobbying campaign to weaken 
the Volcker rule during the conference committee's 
dehberations on the final terms o f Dodd-Frank. The 
conference committee accepted a last-minute compro-
mise that significandy weakened the Volcker Rule and 
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"disappointed" Mr . Volcker.i59 The final compromise 
inserted exemptions in the Volcker Rule that allow 
banks and B H C s to (i) invest up to 3% of their Tier 1 
capital in hedge funds or private equity funds (as long 
as a bank's investments do not exceed 3% of the total 
ownership interests in any single fund), (ii) purchase 
and sell government securities, (iii) engage in "risk-
mitigating hedging activities," (iv) make investments 
through insurance company affihates, and (v) make 
small business investment company investments. The 
compromise also delayed the Volcker Rule's effective 
date so that banks and B H C s wi l l have (A) up to seven 
years after Dodd-Frank's enactment date to bring most 
o f their equity investing and proprietary trading activi-
ties into comphance with the Volcker Rule , and (B) up 
to twelve years to bring "dhquid" investments that were 
i n existence on May 1, 2010, into comphance with the 
Rule . 160 
Probably the most troublesome aspect of the Volcker 
R u l e is that the Rule attempts to distinguish between 
prohibited "proprietary trading" and permissible "mar-
ket making." The Ru le defines "proprietary trading" 
as "engaging as a principal for the trading account 
o f the banking entity," but the Rule aUows "[t]he 
purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of securities 
and other instruments . . . on behalf of customers."i6i 
Distinguishing between proprietary trading and market 
making is "notoriously difEcult,"i62 and analysts pre-
dict that large Wall Street banks wOl seek to evade the 
Volcker Ru le by shifting their trading operations into 
so-called "chent-related businesses."i63 Moreover, the 
parameters of "proprietary trading," "market making" 
and other crucial terms in the Volcker Rule—including 
the exemption for "[r]isk-mitigating hedging activi-
ties"i64—are left open by the statute. 
As a result, the precise meaning of key terms that wiU 
determine the Volcker Rule's impact must be defined 
in regulations adopted jointly by the federal banking 
agencies, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
and the S E C . 165 The agencies issued lengthy proposed 
regulations in October 2011, but the proposed rules 
were "roundly criticized for being overly complex and 
riddled with uncertainty." 166 In view of the Volcker 
Rule's ambiguous terms and numerous exemptions 
that rely on regulatory implementation, many com-
mentators beheve that the Rule probably wi l l not have 
a significant impact i n restraining risk-taking by major 
banks or in preventing them from exploiting their 
safety net subsidies to fund speculative activities. 167 
The Lincoln Amendment 
Section 726 of Dodd-Frank, the " L i n c o l n 
Amendment," was originally sponsored by Senator 
Blanche Lincoln. In Apr i l 2010, Senator Lincoln , as 
chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee, included 
the Lincoln Amendment in derivatives reform legisla-
tion that was passed by the Agriculture Committee and 
subsequendy was combined with the Senate Banking 
Committee's regulatory reform bil l . As adopted by 
the Agriculture Committee, the Lincoln Amendment 
would have barred dealers in swaps and other O T C 
derivatives from receiving any assistance from the D I F 
or from the Fed's discount window or other emergency 
lending facihties.i68 
Senator Lincoln designed her amendment to force 
major banks to "spin off their derivatives operations" i n 
order "to prevent a situation in which a bank's deriva-
tives deals failed and forced taxpayers to bail out the 
institution."169 The Lincoln Amendment was "also an 
effort to crack down on the possibihty that banks would 
use cheaper funding provided by deposits insured by 
the F D I C , to subsidize their trading activities."i70Thus, 
the purposes of the Lincoln Amendment—insulating 
banks from the risks of speculative activities and pre-
venting the spread of safety net subsidies—were similar 
to the objectives of the Volcker Rule , but the Lincoln 
Amendment focused on deahng and trading i n deriva-
tives instead of all types of proprietary trading.i^i 
The Lincoln Amendment provoked "tremendous 
pushback . . . f rom Repubhcans, fellow Democrats, the 
White House, banking regulators, and Wall Street inter-
ests."i72 Large banks claimed that the provision would 
require them to furnish more than $100 bilhon o f 
additional capital to organize separate derivatives trad-
ing subsidiaries.173 A prominent industry analyst opined 
that the provision "ehminates all of the advantages o f 
the afEhation with an insured depository institution, 
which are profound."i74 Those statements reflect a 
common understanding that, as discussed in Part 2 o f 
this article, bank dealers in O T C derivatives enjoy sig-
nificant competitive advaritages over nonbank dealers 
due to the banks' exphcit and imphcit safety net subsi-
dies. The Lincoln Amendment was specifically intended 
to remove those advantages and to force major banks 
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to conduct their derivatives trading operations without 
rehance on federal subsidies. 
As was true with the Volcker Rule , the House-Senate 
conference committee agreed to a final compromise 
that significandy weakened the Lincoln Amendment. 
A s enacted, the Lincoln Amendment allows an F D I C -
insured bank to act as a swaps dealer with regard to (i) 
"[h]edging and other similar risk mitigating activities 
directly related to the [bank's] activities," (u) swaps 
involving interest rates, currency rates and other "ref-
erence assets that are permissible for investment by 
a national bank," including gold and silver (but not 
other types of metals) and energy or agricultural com-
modities, and (ui) credit default swaps that are cleared 
pursuant to Dodd-Frank and carry investment-grade 
ratings.!''? addition, the Lincoln Amendment allows 
banks up to five years after Dodd-Frank's effective date 
to divest or spin off nonconforming derivatives opera-
tions into separate affihates. i^s 
Analysts estimate that the compromised Lincoln 
Amendment wi l l require major banks to spin off only 
ten to twenty percent of their pre-Dodd-Frank deriva-
tives activities into separate affihates."? In addition,banks 
wiU be able to argue for retention o f derivatives that are 
used for "hedging" purposes, an open-ended standard 
that wiU require much elaboration by regulators. As 
i n the case of the Volcker Rule , commentators con-
cluded that the final version o f the Lincoln Amendment 
was "gready diluted,"i8i "significandy weakened,"i82 
and "watered down,"l83 with the result that "the largest 
banks' [derivatives] operations are largely left intact."i84 
The requirement that banks must clear their trades 
of C D S in order to be exempt from the Lincoln 
Amendment is potentially significant. ^  85 However, 
there is no clearing requirement for other derivatives 
(e.g., interest and currency rate swaps) that reference 
assets permissible for investment by national banks 
("bank-ehgible" derivatives). Consequendy, banks may 
continue to trade and deal i n bank-ehgible derivatives 
(except for CDS) without restriction under the Lincoln 
Amendment. 186 As discussed above, however, all "pro-
prietary trading" by banks i n derivatives must comply 
with the Volcker Ru le as implemented by regulators. 
A fundamental purpose o f the Volcker Rule and the 
Lincoln Amendment is to prevent LCFIs from using 
federal safety net subsidies to support their specula-
tive activities in the capital markets. As enacted, both 
provisions have numerous gaps and exemptions that 
undermine their stated purpose. In Part 2 of this article 
(to be pubhshed in A p r i l 2012), I propose a different 
system of bank regulation and deposit insurance that 
is specifically designed to prevent the spread of safety 
net subsidies from banks to affihated companies doing 
business in the capital markets. M y proposal would 
require financial conglomerates to operate their sub-
sidiary banks as "narrow banks" and would prohibit 
"narrow banks" from making extensions of credit or 
other transfers of funds to capital markets affihates. As 
described in Part 2, the "narrow bank" concept and 
related reforms would force financial conglomerates 
to prove that they can produce attractive returns to 
investors without relying on exphcit and imphcit safety 
net subsidies. M y proposed reforms are similar to the 
"ring-fencing" approach recently advocated by the U K 
Independent Commission on Banking and endorsed by 
the Cameron government. 
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Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That 
Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and 
Ahgn US and U K Financial Regulation of 
Financial Conglomerates (Part II) 
By Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. 
Introduction 
In Part I of this article (pubhshed in last month's 
issue), I argued that exphcit and imphcit subsidies for 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banking organizations create 
dangerous distortions in our financial markets and our 
general economy. We must ehminate (or at least gready 
reduce) those subsidies in order to restore a more level 
playing field for smaller financial institutions and to 
encourage the voluntary breakup of inefficient, risky 
financial conglomerates. Unfortunately, as described 
in Part 1, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street R e f o r m and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) fails to solve 
the T B T F problem and leaves open several potential 
avenues for future government bailouts of systemicaUy 
important financial institutions (SIFIs). 
Two major provisions of Dodd-Frank—the Volcker 
Rule and the Lincoln Amendment—seek to prevent 
large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) from using 
federal safety net subsidies to support their speculative 
activities in the capital markets. However, as explained 
in Part 1, both provisions have long phase-in periods 
and broadly-worded exceptions that undermine their 
stated purpose. The Kanjorski Amendment potentiaUy 
could enable the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) to 
force LCFIs to divest high-risk operations. However, 
the FRB's divestiture authority under that provision is 
significandy weakened by numerous procedural hurdles, 
including the required concurrence of two-thirds of the 
members of the Financial StabUity Oversight CouncU 
(FSOC). Although Dodd-Frank gives federal agencies 
valuable new powers to regulate SIFIs, many analysts 
A r t h u r E. W i l m a r t h , Jr. is a Professor of Law and Executive 
Director of the Center for Law, Economics & Finance, George 
Washington University Law School.This article is based on 
testimony he presented on December 7,2011, before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection 
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
and market participants expect that SIFIs wUl continue 
to benefit from T B T F baUouts during future systemic 
financial crises. 
Part 2 proposes a new approach to financial regula-
tory reform. M y proposals are designed to (i) prevent 
SIFIs from using the federal safety net to subsidize 
their speculative activities in the capital markets, and 
(u) make it easier for regulators to separate banks from 
their nonbank affiliates when SIFIs faU. I recommend a 
two-tiered system of bank regulation and a pre-funded 
systemic risk insurance fund that could shrink safety net 
subsidies and minimize the hkehhood of government 
baUouts for faihng SIFIs. I would require banks owned 
by LCFIs to operate as "narrow banks," an approach 
that is simUar to the ring-fencing reforms recendy 
endorsed by the U K government for large financial 
conglomerates. The "narrow bank" concept could cre-
ate a consistent regulatory regime for LCFIs in the two 
nations that contain the most important global finan-
cial centers—New York and London. Moreover, joint 
approval of a "narrow bank" requirement by the U S and 
U K would place substantial pressure on other European 
U n i o n (EU) nations and other developed countries to 
adopt a simUar regiUatory approach for LCFIs . 
Banks Controlled by Financial 
Conglomerates Should Operate as 
<*Narrow Banks'* so that They Cannot 
Transfer Their Federal Safety Net 
Subsidies to Their Nonbank Affiliates 
In order to prevent the spread o f federal safety 
net subsidies from banks to their affihates involved in 
capital markets activities. Congress should mandate a 
two-tiered structure of bank regulation and deposit 
insurance.! g^^j. ^^ ^^  of "traditional" banking orga-
nizations would provide a relatively broad range of 
banking-related services, but those organizations would 
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n o t be allowed to engage, or afiiliate with firms engaged, 
i n securities underwriting or deahng, insurance under-
wr i t ing , or derivatives deahng or trading. In contrast, 
the second tier of "narrow banks" could affiliate with 
"nontraditional" financial conglomerates engaged in 
capital markets operations (except for private equity 
investments). However, "narrow banks" would be pro-
hibited from making any extensions of credit or other 
transfers of fiinds to their nonbank afiUiates, except for 
lav^ul dividends paid to their parent holding companies. 
T h e "narrow bank" approach provides the most pohti-
cally feasible approach for ensuring that banks cannot 
transfer their safety net subsidies to affihated companies 
engaged in speculative transactions in the capital mar-
kets. It is therefore consistent with the objectives of both 
the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment. 
The First Tier of Traditional Banking Organizations 
Under my proposal, the first tier of regulated bank-
i n g firms would be "traditional" banking organizations 
that hmit their activities (including the activities o f 
all holding company affihates) to hnes o f business 
that satisfy the "closely related to banking" test under 
Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act 
( B H C Act).2 For example, this first tier of traditional 
banks could take deposits, make loans, offer fiduciary 
services, and act as agents in seUing securities, mutual 
funds and insurance products underwritten by non-
affihated firms. Additionally, they could underwrite and 
deal i n "bank-eHgible" securities that national banks are 
permitted to underwrite and deal in directly.^ First-tier 
banking organizations could also purchase, as end-users, 
derivatives transactions that (i) hedge against their 
own firm-specific risks, and (ii) quahfy for hedging 
treatment under Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 
Statement N o . 133^ 
Most first-tier banking firms would probably be 
small and midsized community-oriented banks. In the 
past, those banks typically have not engaged as principal 
i n insurance underwriting, securities underwriting or 
deahng, derivatives deahng or trading, or other capital 
markets activities. Community banks should be encour-
aged to continue their primary business o f attracting 
core deposits, providing "high touch," relationship-based 
loans to consumers and to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), and offering wealth management 
and other fiduciary services to local customers. (In 
sharp contrast to traditional community banks, large 
banks provide impersonal, highly automated lending 
and deposit programs to SMEs and consumers, and large 
banks also focus on complex, higher-risk transactions 
in the capital markets.)^ Traditional, first-tier banks and 
their holding companies should continue to operate 
under their current supervisory arrangements, and all 
deposits of first-tier banks (up to the current statutory 
maximum of $250,000 per quahfying account) should 
be covered by deposit insurance. 
In order to provide reasonable flexibHity to first-
tier banking organizations, Congress should amend 
§ 4(c)(8) of the B H C Act by permitting the F R B to 
expand the hst of "closely related" activities that are 
permissible for holding company affUiates of traditional 
banks.6 However, Congress should prohibit first-tier 
bank holding companies from engaging as principal in 
underwriting or deahng in securities (except for bank-
ehgible securities), underwriting any type of insurance 
(except for credit insurance), deahng or trading in 
derivatives, or making private equity investments. 
The Second Tier of Nontraditional Banking 
Organizations 
Unhke first-tier banking firms, the second tier 
of "nontraditional" banking organizations would be 
allowed to engage, through nonbank subsidiaries, in 
(i) underwriting and deahng (i.e., proprietary trad-
ing) in "bank-inehgible" securities,'' (ii) underwriting 
ah types of insurance, and (iii) deahng and trading in 
derivatives. Second-tier banking organizations would 
include: (A) financial holding companies (FHCs) reg-
istered under §§ 4(k) and 4{l) of the B H C Act,8 (B) 
holding companies owning grandfathered "nonbank 
banks," and (C) grandfathered "unitary thrift" holding 
companies.^ In addition, firms controUing industrial 
banks should be required either to register as F H C s or 
to divest their ownership of such banks i f they cannot 
comply with the B H C Act's prohibition against com-
mercial activities.10 Second-tier holding companies 
would thus encompass aU of the largest banking orga-
nizations, most of which are heavUy engaged in capital 
markets activities, as weU as other financial conglomer-
ates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions. 
Congress Should Require a "Narrow Bank" Structure 
for Second-Tier Banks 
Under my proposal, FDIC-insured banks that are 
subsidiaries of second-tier holding companies would 
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be required to operate as "narrow banks." The purpose 
of the narrow bank structure would be to prevent a 
"nontraditional" second-tier holding company from 
transferring the bank's federal safety net subsiches to its 
nonbank alEhates. 
Narrow banks could offer FDIC-insured deposit 
accounts, including checking and savings accounts and 
certificates of deposit. Narrow banks would hold all of 
their assets in the form of cash and marketable, short-
term debt obhgations, including quahfying government 
securities, highly-rated commercial paper and other 
hquid, short-term debt instruments that are ehgible for 
investment by money market mutual funds ( M M M F s ) 
under the rules of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Narrow banks could not hold any 
other types of loans or investments, nor could they 
accept any uninsured deposits. Narrow banks would 
present a very small risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund 
(DIF), because (i) each narrow bank's non-cash assets 
would consist solely of short-term securities that could 
be "marked to market" on a daily basis, and the F D I C 
could therefore readily determine whether a narrow 
bank was threatened with insolvency, and (ii) the F D I C 
could prompdy convert a narrow bank's assets into cash 
i f the F D I C decided to hquidate the bank and pay off 
the claims of its insured depositors. 
Thus, narrow banks would effectively operate as 
FDIC-insured M M M F s . To prevent unfair competition 
with narrow banks, and to avoid future government 
bailouts o f uninsured M M M F s , M M M F s should be 
prohibited from representing, either exphcidy or 
imphcidy, that they wiU redeem their shares based on a 
stable net asset value (NAV) of $1 per share. Currendy, 
the M M M F industry (which manages about $3 trdhon 
of assets) leads investors to beheve that their fiinds wOl 
be available for withdrawal (redemption) based on an 
assured price of $1 per s h a r e . N o t surprisingly, "the 
$1 share price gives investors the false impression that 
money-market funds are hke [FDIC-insured] bank 
accounts and can't lose money."!^ However, "[t]hat 
myth was shattered in 2008," when Lehman's default on 
its commercial paper caused Reserve Primary Fund (a 
large M M M F that invested heavily in Lehman's paper) 
to suffer large losses and to "break the buck."i4 Reserve 
Primary Fund's inabihty to redeem its shares based on 
a N A V of $1 per share caused an investor panic that 
precipitated runs on several M M M F s . The Treasury 
Department responded by estabhshing the M o n e y 
Market Fund Guarantee Program ( M M F G P ) , which 
protected investors in participating M M M F s between 
October 2008 and September 2009.^5 
Critics of M M M F s maintain that the Treasury's 
M M F G P has created an expectation of similar gov-
ernment bailouts i f M M M F s "break the buck" i n the 
future.16 For example, former F R B chairman Paul 
Volcker has argued that M M M F s weaken banks because 
of their abihty to offer bank-hke products without 
equivalent regulation. M M M F s typically offer accounts 
with check-writing features, and they provide returns 
to investors that are higher than bank deposit accounts 
because M M M F s do not have to pay F D I C insurance 
premiums or comply with other banking regula-
tions. A Group of Thir ty report, which M r . Volcker 
spearheaded, proposed that M M M F s that wish to offer 
bank-hke services, such as checking accounts and wi th -
drawals based on a stable N A V of $1 per share, should 
reorganize as "special-purpose banks" with appropriate 
governmental supervision and insurance.!^ In contrast, 
M M M F s that do not wish to operate as banks should 
be required to base their redemption price on a floating 
N A V , so that investors are not encouraged to beheve 
that they can always redeem their shares at par.i^ 
If Congress required nonbank M M M F s to base 
their redemption price on a floating N A V and also 
adopted my proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank 
regulation, many M M M F s would probably decide 
to reorganize as FDIC-insured narrow banks and 
would become subsidiaries of second-tier FHCs .20 As 
explained above, rules restricting the assets of narrow 
banks to commercial paper, government securities and 
other types of marketable, highly-hquid investments 
would protect the D I F from any significant loss i f a 
narrow bank failed. 
Four Additional Rules Would Prevent 
Narrow Banks from Transferring Safety 
Net Subsidies to Their Affiliates 
Congress should adopt four supplemental rules to 
prevent second-tier holding companies from exploiting 
their narrow banks' safety net subsidies. First, narrow 
banks should be absolutely prohibited—^without any 
possibihty of a regulatory waiver—from making any 
extensions of credit or other transfers of funds to their 
affihates, except for the payment of lawful dividends 
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out of profits to their parent holding companies. 
Currendy, transactions between FDIC-insured banks 
and their affihates are restricted by §§ 23A and 23B 
o f the Federal Reserve Act.22 Flowever, the F R B has 
repeatedly waived those restrictions during recent 
financial crises.The FRB's waivers allowed bank subsid-
iaries of F H C s to provide extensive support to affihated 
securities broker-dealers and M M M F s . B y granting 
those waivers, the F R B enabled F H C - o w n e d banks 
to transfer the safety net subsidy provided by low-cost, 
FDIC-insured deposits to their nonbank affihates.^3 
Dodd-Frank hmits the authority of the F P ^ to grant 
future waivers or exemptions under §§ 23A and 23B, 
because it requires the F R B to obtain the concurrence 
o f either the O C C (with respect to waivers granted by 
orders for national banks) or the F D I C (with respect to 
waivers granted by orders for state banks or exemptions 
granted by ru l emak ing) .Even so,it is unhkely that the 
O C C or the F D I C would refiise to concur with the 
F P J i ' s proposal for a waiver under conditions of finan-
cial stress. Accordingly, Dodd-Frank does not ensure 
that the restrictions on affihate transactions in §§ 23A 
and 23B wiU be adhered to i n a crisis setting. 
For example, in 2011 the F R B permitted Bank of 
America (BofA) to evade the restrictions of § 23A by 
transferring an undisclosed amount of derivatives con-
tracts from its Mer r i l l broker-dealer subsidiary to its 
subsidiary bank. That transaction increased the potential 
risk that the DIF and taxpayers ultimately might have 
to cover losses incurred by B o f A on the transferred 
derivatives. However, the transfer reportedly allowed 
BofA—^which was strugghng with a host of problems— 
to avoid contractual requirements to post $3.3 bilhon in 
additional collateral with counterparties, due to the fact 
that BofA's subsidiary bank held a significantly higher 
credit rating than MerriU.^s One commentator noted 
that "the Fed's priorities seem to he with protecting 
[BofA] from losses at Mer r i l l , even i f that means greater 
risks for the FDIC's insurance fund."^^ 
M y proposal for second-tier narrow banks would 
replace §§ 23A and 23B with an absolute rule. That rule 
would completely prohibit any extensions of credit or 
other transfers of funds by second-tier banks to their 
nonbank affihates (except for lawful dividends paid to 
parent holding companies). Thus, my proposal would 
bar federal regulators from approving any transfers of 
safety net subsidies by narrow banks to their affihates. 
A n absolute bar on affihate transactions is necessary to 
prevent FDIC-insured banks from being used as back-
door bailout devices for their nonbank affihates. 
Second, as discussed above in Part 1, Congress 
should repeal the systemic risk exception (SRE) cur-
rently included in the Federal Deposit Insurance Ac t 
(FDI Act). B y repeahng the S B ^ , Congress would 
require the F D I C to follow the least cosdy resolution 
procedure for every failed bank, and the F D I C could 
no longer rely on the T B T F pohcy as a justification 
for protecting uninsured creditors of a failed bank or 
its nonbank affihates. Repeahng the SPJE would thus 
ensure that the DIF could not be used to support a 
bailout of uninsured creditors of a failed or faiHng SIFI. 
Removing the S B ^ from the F D I Act would also make 
clear to the financial markets that the DIF only protects 
bank depositors. Uninsured creditors of SIFIs and their 
nonbank subsidiaries would therefore have stronger 
incentives to monitor the financial operations and con-
dition of such entities.27 
Additionally, a repeal of the S R E would mean that 
smaller banks would no longer bear any part of the 
cost of protecting uninsured creditors of T B T F banks. 
Under current law, all FDIC-insured banks must pay a 
special assessment (allocated in proportion to their total 
assets) to reimburse the F D I C for the cost of protecting 
uninsured claimants of a T B T F bank under the SB^.^S 
A 2000 F D I C report noted the unfairness of expecting 
smaller banks to help pay for "systemic risk" bailouts 
when "it is virtually inconceivable that they would 
receive similar treatment i f distressed."^^ The F D I C 
report suggested that the way to correct this inequity 
is "to remove the [SRE] ,"30 as my proposal would do. 
Third, second-tier narrow banks should be barred 
from purchasing derivatives except as end-users in 
transactions that quahfy for hedging treatment under 
FAS 133. M y proposal would require all second-tier 
banking organizations to conduct their derivatives 
deahng and trading activities through separate nonbank 
affihates, in the same manner that G L B A currently 
requires all underwriting and deahng in bank-inehgible 
securities to be conducted through nonbank affihates 
of FHCs .3 i Prohibiting second-tier banks from deahng 
and trading in derivatives would accomphsh an essential 
goal o f the Volcker Ru le and the Lincoln Amendment, 
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because it would prevent F H C s from continuing to 
exploit federal safety net subsidies by conducting 
speculative trading activities within their FDIC-insured 
bank subsidiaries. 
As shown by BofA's transfer of derivatives from 
Mer r i l l to its bank subsidiary in 2011, bank dealers in 
O T C derivatives enjoy significant competitive advan-
tages over nonbank dealers, due to banks' exphcit and 
imphcit safety net subsidies. Banks typically borrow 
funds at substantially lower interest rates than their 
holding company affUiates because (i) banks can obtain 
direct, low-cost funding through FDIC-insured depos-
its, and (u) banks present lower risks to their creditors 
because of their direct access to other federal safety net 
resources, including (A) the FRB's discount window 
lending facihty, (B) the FRB's guarantee of interbank 
payments made on Fedwire, and (C) the greater poten-
tial avaUabihty of T B T F baUouts for uninsured creditors 
of banks (as compared to creditors of bank holding 
companies).32 
The O C C has noted that F H C s generate higher 
profits when they conduct derivatives activities directiy 
within their banks, in part because the "favorable 
[funding] rate enjoyed by the banks" is lower than "the 
borrowing rate of their holding companies."33 Such an 
outcome may be favorable to F H C s , but it is certainly 
not beneficial to the DIF and taxpayers. The DIF and 
taxpayers are exposed to a significantly higher risk of 
losses when derivatives deahng and trading activities 
are conducted direcdy within banks instead of within 
nonbank holding company affUiates. Congress should 
terminate this artificial, federaUy-subsidized advantage 
for bank derivatives dealers.34 
Fourth, Congress should prohibit aU private equity 
investments by second-tier banks and their holding 
company affUiates. To accomphsh this reform—which 
would be consistent with the Volcker Ru le as or igi -
naUy proposed—Congress should repeal Sections 4(k) 
(4)(H) and (I) o f the B H C Act,35 which aUow F H C s 
to make merchant banking investments and insurance 
company portfoho investments.36 Private equity invest-
ments involve a high degree of risk and have inflicted 
significant losses on F H C s in the past.37 In addition, 
private equity investments threaten to "weaken the 
separation of banking and conmierce" by aUowing 
F H C s "to maintain long-term control over entities that 
conduct commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) businesses."38 
Such affUiations between banks and commercial firms 
are undesirable because they are hkely to create serious 
competitive and economic distortions, including the 
spread of federal safety net benefits to the commercial 
sector of our economy. 39 
In combination, the four supplemental rules described 
above would help to ensure that narrow banks can-
not transfer their federal safety net subsidies to their 
nonbank affihates. Restricting the scope o f safety net 
subsidies is of utmost importance in order to restore a 
more level playing field between smaU and large banks, 
and between banking and nonbanking firms. Safety net 
subsidies have increasingly distorted our regulatory and 
economic pohcies over the past three decades. D u r i n g 
that period, nonbanking firms have pursued every 
avaUable avenue to acquire FDIC-insured depository 
institutions so that they can secure the fiinding advan-
tages provided by low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits. A t 
the same time, nonbank affihates of banks have made 
every effort to exploit the funding advantages and other 
safety net benefits conferred by their affUiation wi th 
FDIC-insured institutions. 
The most practicable way to prevent the spread of 
federal safety net subsidies—as weU as their distort-
ing effects on regulation and economic activity—-is 
to estabhsh strong barriers that prohibit narrow banks 
from transferring their subsidies to their nonbanking 
affUiates, including those engaged in speculative capi-
tal markets activities. The narrow bank structure and 
the supplemental rules described above would force 
financial conglomerates to prove that they can pro-
duce superior risk-related returns to investors without 
relying on exphcit and imphcit government subsidies. 
Economic studies have faUed to confirm the existence 
of favorable economies of scale or scope in giant finan-
cial conglomerates, and those conglomerates have not 
been able to generate consistendy positive returns, even 
under the current regulatory system that aUows them to 
capture extensive federal subsidies. 
In late 2009, a prominent bank analyst suggested 
that i f Congress prevented nonbank subsidiaries of 
F H C s from relying on low-cost deposit funding pro-
vided by their affUiated banks, large F H C s would not 
be economicaUy viable and would be forced to break 
up voluntarUy.42 Many of the largest commercial 
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and industrial conglomerates in the U.S. and Europe 
have been broken up through hostile takeovers and 
voluntary divestitures during the past three decades 
because they proved to be "less efficient and less profit-
able than companies pursuing more fijcused business 
strategies."43 It is long past time {or financial conglom-
erates to be stripped of their safety net subsidies and 
their presumptive access to T B T F bailouts so that they 
wiU be subject to the same type o f scrutiny and disci-
phne that the capital markets have already apphed to 
commercial and industrial conglomerates. The narrow 
bank concept provides a workable plan to impose such 
scrutiny and disciphne on F H C s . 
Responses to Critiques of tiie Narrow 
Banic Proposal 
Critics have raised three major objections to the nar-
row bank concept. First, critics point out that the asset 
restrictions imposed on narrow banks would prevent 
them from acting as intermediaries o f funds between 
depositors and most borrowers. Many narrow bank 
proposals (including mine) would require narrow banks 
to invest their deposits in safe, highly marketable assets 
such as those permitted for M M M F s . Narrow banks 
would therefore be largely or entirely barred from 
making commercial loans. Critics warn that a banking 
system composed exclusively o f narrow banks could not 
provide credit to SMEs that lack access to the capital 
markets and depend on banks as their primary source 
of outside credit.'*'^ 
However, my two-tiered proposal would greatly 
reduce any disruption o f the traditional role o f banks 
i n acting as intermediaries between depositors and 
bank-dependent firms, because my proposal would 
aUow first-tier "traditional" banks (primarily commu-
nity-oriented banks) to continue making commercial 
loans that are funded by deposits. Communi ty banks 
make most o f their commercial loans i n the fo rm 
of longer-term "relationship" loans to SMEs . Under 
my proposal, community banks could continue to 
carry on their deposit-taking and lending activities as 
first-tier banking organizations without any change 
f rom current law, and their primary commercial 
lending customers would continue to be smaller, 
bank-dependent firms. 
In contrast to community banks, big banks do not 
make a substantial amount of relationship loans to small 
firms. Instead, big banks primarily make loans to large 
and weU-estabhshed firms, and they provide credit 
to small businesses mainly through highly automated 
programs that use impersonal credit scoring tech-
niques. Under my proposal, as indicated above, most 
large banks would operate as subsidiaries of second-tier 
"nontraditional" banking organizations. Second-tier 
holding companies would conduct their business lend-
ing programs through nonbank finance subsidiaries 
that are flmded by commercial paper and other debt 
instruments sold to investors in the capital markets. 
That operational structure should not create a sub-
stantial disincentive for the highly automated small 
business lending programs offered by big banks, because 
most loans produced by those programs (e.g., business 
credit card loans) can be financed through the capital 
markets.46 
Thus, my two-tier proposal should not cause a sig-
nificant reduction in bank loans to bank-dependent 
firms, because big banks have already moved away from 
traditional relationship-based lending funded by depos-
its. If Congress wanted to give LCFIs a strong incentive 
to make relationship loans to smaU and midsized firms. 
Congress could authorize second-tier banks to devote 
a hmited percentage (e.g., 10 percent) of their assets to 
such loans, as long as the banks held the loans on their 
balance sheets and did not securitize them. B y autho-
rizing such a hmited "basket" of relationship loans, 
Congress could aUow second-tier banks to use deposits 
to fund those loans without exposing the banks to a 
significant risk of faUure, since the remainder of their 
assets would be highly hquid and marketable. 
The second major criticism of the narrow bank pro-
posal is that it would lack credibUity because regulators 
would retain the inherent authority (whether exphcit 
or imphcit) to organize baUouts of major financial firms 
during periods of severe economic distress. Accordingly, 
some critics maintain that the narrow bank concept 
would simply shift the T B T F problem from insured 
banks to their nonbank affihates."'^ However, the force 
of this objection has been weakened by the systemic 
risk oversight and resolution regime estabhshed by 
Dodd-Frank. As Part 1 explains, F H C s that might 
have been considered for T B T F baUouts in the past 
wUl be designated and regulated as SIFIs and wUl also 
be subject to resolution under Dodd-Frank's Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA) . As explained in both 
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Parts 1 and 2, the potential for T B T F bailouts of SIFIs 
would be reduced further i f (i) Congress required 
all SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to pre-fund the 
Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), so that the O L F 
would have the necessary resources to handle future 
resolutions of failed SIFIs, and (u) Congress repealed 
the S R E so that the DIF would no longer be available 
as a potential bailout fund for T B T F institutions. 
Thus, i f my proposed reforms were fuUy imple-
mented, (i) the narrow bank structure would prevent 
SIFI-owned banks from transferring their safety net 
subsidies to their nonbank affihates, and (u) Dodd-
Frank's systemic risk oversight and resolution regime 
would require SIFIs to internahze the potential risks 
that their operations present to financial and economic 
stabihty In combination, both sets of regulatory reforms 
would gready reduce the T B T F subsidies that might 
otherwise be available to large financial conglomerates. 
Moreover, the narrow bank structure would increase 
the effectiveness of Dodd-Frank's requirement for "hv-
ing wiUs" (resolution plans) by making it much easier 
for regulators to separate banks owned by failed SIFIs 
from their nonbank affihates. As explained above, nar-
row banks would not be allowed to become entangled 
with their nonbank affihates through extensions of 
credit and other transfers of funds.48 
The third principal objection to the narrow bank 
proposal is that it would place U.S. F H C s at a signifi-
cant disadvantage in competing with foreign universal 
banks that are not required to comply with similar 
constraints. Again, there are persuasive rebuttals to this 
objection. In September 2011 the U . K . Independent 
Commission on Banking (ICB) issued a report advo-
cating a reform program similar to my proposal. The 
I C B called for large financial conglomerates to adopt 
a "ring-fenced" structure that would separate and 
"insulate" their retail banking operations—includ-
ing deposit-taking and lending services provided to 
consumers and SMEs—^from their wholesale activi-
ties in the capital markets.50 Thus, the ICB's program 
would require financial conglomerates to "build fire-
walls between their consumer units and investment 
banks" and would hkely cause "a jump i n the cost of 
funding for their investment-banking divisions as the 
imphcit [U.K.] government guarantee is removed."5i 
In December 2011, the U . K . government pledged to 
enact legislation implementing the ICB's "ring-fencing" 
recommendations by May 2015.52 U . K . Chancellor 
of the Exchequer George Osborne declared that 
the implementing legislation would "separate [retail] 
banking from investment banking to protect the Brit ish 
economy, protect British taxpayers, and make sure that 
nothing is too big to fail."53 
If the U.S. and the U . K . both decide to mandate a nar-
row banking structure (supplemented by strong systemic 
risk oversight and resolution regimes), their combined 
leadership in global financial markets would (i) preclude 
claims by global SIFIs that they would face an unlevel 
playing field i f they competed in both the N e w York 
and London financial markets, and (u) place considerable 
pressure on other major global financial centers to adopt 
similar financial reforms.54 The financial sector accounts 
for a large share of the domestic economies of the U.S. 
and U . K . Both economies were severely damaged by 
two financial crises during the past decade (the dotcom-
telecom bust and the subprime lending crisis). Both 
crises were caused (at least in part) by a group of SIFIs 
that continues to dominate the financial systems in both 
nations. Accordingly, regardless of what other nations 
may do, the U.S. and the U . K . have compeUing national 
reasons to make sweeping changes to their financial sys-
tems in order to protect their domestic economies from 
the threat of a similar crisis in the future.^S 
Arguments by the financial services industry that the 
U.S. and the U . K . should not implement fundamen-
tal financial reforms untU aU other major developed 
nations have agreed to do so rest upon two deeply 
flawed assumptions: (i) the U.S. and the U . K . should 
aUow foreign nations with the weakest systems o f finan-
cial regulation to set the maximum level of supervisory 
constraints on global SIFIs, and (ii) untU a comprehen-
sive international agreement on supervisory reform 
is achieved, the U.S. and the U . K . should continue to 
provide T B T F baUouts and other safety net subsidies 
that impose huge costs, create moral hazard and distort 
economic incentives, simply because other nations pro-
vide simUar benefits to their SIFIs.56 Both assumptions 
are unacceptable and must be rejected. 
Conclusion 
Dodd-Frank makes meaningful improvements 
in the regulation of large financial conglomerates. 
Dodd-Frank estabhshes a new umbreUa oversight 
body—the FSOC—that wUl designate nonbank SIFIs 
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a n d make recommendations for the supervision o f 
those institutions and large bank holding companies. 
Dodd-Frank also empowers the F R B to adopt stronger 
capital requirements and other enhanced prudential 
standards for both types of SIFIs. Most importantly, 
Dodd-Frank estabhshes the O L A as a new resolution 
regime for failed SIFIs. However, the O L A ' s feasibihty 
remains unproven with regard to global SIFIs that oper-
ate across multiple national borders, since most foreign 
countries have not adopted resolution procedures that 
are compatible with the O L A . ^ ' 
In addition, as explained i n Part 1, the O L A does 
no t completely shut the door to future government 
support for creditors of SIFIs. The F R B can still pro-
vide emergency hquidity assistance to troubled SIFIs 
through the discount window and through "broad-
based" hquidity faciUties like the Primary Dealer 
Credi t Facility. F H L B s can stiU make collaterahzed 
advances to SIFIs. The F D I C can potentiaUy use its 
Treasury borrowing authority and the S R E to protect 
uninsured creditors of faUed SIFIs and their subsidiary 
banks. While Dodd-Frank has made T B T F bailouts 
more difficult, the continued existence of these avenues 
f o r financial assistance indicates that Dodd-Frank is not 
Hkely to stop regulators from protecting creditors o f 
troubled SIFIs during future episodes o f systemic 
financial distress. 
Dodd-Frank also rehes heavUy on the same super-
visory tools—capital-based regulation and prudential 
supervision—and the same regulatory agencies that 
failed to prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 
1980s and the current financial crisis. As Simon Johnson 
and James Kwak have observed: 
[Sjolutions that depend on smarter, better regulatory 
supervision and corrective action ignore the pohtical 
constraints on regulation and the pohtical power of the 
large banks. The idea that we can simply regulate large 
banks more effectively assumes that regulators wUl have 
the incentive to do so, despite everything we know 
about regulatory capture and pohtical constraints on 
regulation.58 
Congress could have addressed the T B T F problem 
direcdy by mandating a breakup of large financial 
conglomerates. Johnson and Kwak have proposed 
maximum size hmits that would require a significant 
reduction in size for each of the six largest U.S. bank-
ing organizations.59 Like Joseph Stightz, Johnson and 
Kwak maintain that "[t]he best defense against a massive 
financial crisis is a popular consensus that too big to faU 
is too big to exist."60 
However, during the Senate's floor debates on 
Dodd-Frank, the Senate rejected a simUar proposal for 
maximum size hmits by almost a two-to-one vote.^^ 
Given the pohtical clout wielded by megabanks, it 
seems urUikely that Congress wUl impose such size 
hmits absent a devastating future crisis. 
M y recommended approach is to impose structural 
requirements and activity hmitations that would (i) pre-
vent SIFIs from using the federal safety net to subsidize 
their speculative activities in the capital markets, and 
(ii) make it much easier for regulators to separate banks 
from their nonbank afiUiates when SIFIs are threatened 
with faUure. A pre-funded O L F would require aU SIFIs 
to pay risk-based assessments to finance the future 
costs of resolving faded SIFIs. A repeal of the S R E 
would prevent the DIF from being used as a backdoor 
baUout fund for nondeposit creditors of megabanks. A 
two-tiered system of bank regulation would (i) restrict 
traditional banking organizations to deposit-taking, 
lending, fiduciary services and other activities that are 
"closely related" to banking, and (ii) mandate a "narrow 
bank" structure for banks owned by financial conglom-
erates. In turn, the narrow bank structure would (A) 
insulate narrow banks and the DIF from the risks o f 
capital markets activities conducted by nonbank affih-
ates, and (B) prevent narrow banks from transferring 
their FDIC-insured, low-cost funding advantages and 
other safety net subsidies to nonbank affihates. 
M y recommended reforms would remove many o f 
the government subsidies that are currently exploited 
by LCFIs and would subject them to the same type o f 
market disciphne that investors have apphed in breaking 
up commercial and industrial conglomerates over the 
past thirty years. Financial conglomerates have never 
demonstrated that they can provide beneficial services 
to their customers and attractive returns to their inves-
tors without relying on safety net subsidies during good 
times and massive taxpayer-funded baUouts during 
crises. It is long past time for LCFIs to prove—^based 
on a true market test—that their claimed synergies and 
their supposedly superior business model are real and 
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not mythical.62 If SIFIs cannot produce favorable results 
without their current T B T F subsidies, market forces 
should compel them to break up voluntarily.. 
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